Bowling Together in the Cross-Border Regions of the Schengen Zone

Tinatini Dvalishvili

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**Ilia State University**

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Declaration

"I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where states otherwise by reference or acknowledgement, the work presented is entirely my own."

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Abstract

The core-periphery division still exists across EU member states. The border regions are mainly regarded as underdeveloped peripheral areas. Therefore, territorial cohesion at the internal and external borders of the Schengen zone emerges equally crucial and turns to become a common priority for EU states. In chorus, the growing interdependence among EU members increases the need for a closer integration at all EU territorial levels (supranational, national, sub-national and local). This could only be achieved if territorial concerns are shared and well-rooted in the national, regional, and local development strategies of EU member states.

Cross-border cooperation is a multifaceted polity, which requires full engagement of multiple actors (state, private, non- or semi-state) operating at various territorial levels. More specifically, this thesis explores the impact of international/continental/supranational (the EU in this case), national (positioning of cross-border negotiations in the governmental agenda), sub-regional and municipal/local levels and dynamics of their interdependence in the cross-border practices across the Schengen internal and external borders. It refers to both layer and marble cake interpretations of multi-level governance (MLG) and unfolds which type better explains the cross-border reality on the eastern and southern borders of Estonia. The field research and semi-structured interviews demonstrate that the dynamics of Estonian cross-border reality could not be explained by a single approach, but both types co-exist with some divergence in the east and south.

Keywords: Border Studies, Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC), Multi-Level Governance (MLG), Marble/Layer Cake, Estonia

აბსტრაქტი

ევროკავშირის წევრ ქვეყნებში ჯერ კიდევ არსებობს ტერიტორიის ცენტრალურ და პერიფერიულ ზონებად დაყოფის მანკიერი მოდელი. საზღვრისპირა რეგიონები ძირითადად მიიჩნევა ნაკლებგანვითარებულ პერიფერიად. შესაბამისად, ევროკავშირის წევრი ქვეყნებისთვის პრიორიტეტულია დაბალანსებული ტერიტორიული განვითარება, რაც მოიცავს როგორც შენგენის შიდა, ასევე გარე საზღვრებსაც.

მუდმივად მზარდი ურთიერთდამოკიდებულება ევროკავშირის წევრ ქვეყნებს შორის საჭიროებს მჭიდრო თანამშრომლობას ყველა ტერიტორიულ (კონტინენტურ, ეროვნულ, რეგიონულ და მუნიციპალურ/ადგილობრივ) დონეზე. ამის მიღწევა კი შესაძლებელია მხოლოდ იმ შემთხვევაში თუ ტერიტორიული ერთიანობის საკითხი წევრი ქვეყნების ეროვნული, რეგიონური და ადგილობრივი განვითარების სტრატეგიაში გათვალისწინებული იქნება.

ტრანს-სასაზღვრო თანამშრომლობა არის მრავალმხრივი პოლიტიკა, რომელიც გულისხმობს სხვადასხვა ტერიტორიულ დონეზე მოქმედი აქტორების (სახელმწიფო, კერძო, არასამთავრობო ან ნახევრად სამთავრობო) ჩართულობას. ნაშრომის მიზანია შეისწავლოს საერთაშორისო/კონტინენტური/სუპრანაციონალური (მოცემულ შემთხვევაში - ევროკავშირი), ეროვნული (იგულისხმება სამთავრობო დღის წესრიგი), რეგიონური და მუნიციპალური/ადგილობრივი დონეების გავლენა ტრანსსასაზღვრო თანამშრომლობის განვითარებაზე შენგენის შიდა და გარე საზღვრებზე. ნაშრომი განიხილავს მრავალდონიანი მმართველობის ორ მოდელს და ხსნის თუ რომელი მოდელი უკეთ აღწერს ტრანსასაზღვრო რეალობას ესტონეთის სამხრეთ და აღმოსავლეთ საზღვრებზე. სავ ელე კვლევა და ნახევრად სტრუქტურირებული ინტერვიუები ნათლად მიუთითებს, რომ ესტონეთის ტრანსასაზღვრო რეალობა შეუძლებელია აიხსნას სრულყოფილად მხოლოდ ერთი მოდელით, და სასურველია ორივე მოდელის გამოყენება, თუმცა მათი მახასიათებლები მცირე განსხვავებებს ამჟღავნებს ესტონეთის აღმოსავლეთ და სამხრეთ საზღვრებთან მიმართებით.

ძირითადი საძიებო სიტყვები: საზღვრების შესწავლა, ტრანსასასაზღვრო თანამშრომლობა, მრავალდონიანი მმართველობა, მრავალდონიანი მმართველობის ტიპები, ესტონეთი.

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Finally, I would like to thank my family members for the favorable working environment.

Abbreviation

EU - The European Union

AEBR - Association of European Border Regions

CBC - Cross-Border Cooperation

CBRs - Cross-Border Regions

CLRAE - Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe

CoE - Council of Europe

CSOs – Civil Society Organizations

EEC – European Economic Community

EGTC - The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation

ENI - European Neighbourhood Instrument

ERDF - European Regional Development Fund

ESDP – European Spatial Development Perspective

ETC - European Territorial Cooperation, known as **INTERREG**

IPA - Instrument for Pre-Accession and European Neighborhood Instrument

LI - Liberal Intergovernmentalism

NF – Neo -Functionalism

SMEs –Small and Medium Size Enterprises

TA2020 - Territorial Agenda of the European Union 2020

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Introduction

The flows of globalization, empowerment of regional actors, rapid growth of mobility and capital have re-arranged the geographical grounds of social, political and economic order (Sohn and Reitel 2013, 306). Consequently, the system of traditional state-centered planning has been replaced by the discourse on territorial cohesion, state de-territorialization, fuzzy boundaries, "European spatial planning" and "Europeanization of spatial planning" (Olesen 2012, 910; Jacobs 2016, 69). Cross-border cooperation (CBC) emerges as a by-product of this spatial re-shaping at lower (subnational and local) scales.

Typically, borders mark different historical, social, cultural, institutional and political realities on both sides of frontier, but planning in cross-border settings goes far beyond the nation-state context, bridges communities and facilitates emergence of soft spaces. Soft space is a new networked form of governance smoothing the collaboration across different policy sectors and administrative boundaries. Accordingly, cross-border cooperation questions the traditional/formal territorial planning established through time, and promotes strategic synergies across municipal boundaries and constructs a new social-political reality (Olesen 2012, 919). Moreover, it upholds more flexible and solution-based strategic planning in the cross-border area to gain particular ends.

This thesis outlines leading social, political and economic-wise arguments to explain the actuality and impact of the study of cross-border cooperation. First, this research discusses cross-border cooperation as the way of generating social capital through bowling together in the cross-border area. Second, cross-border cooperation tops the regional political agenda of the EU, and third, the Union largely contributes financially to develop border areas. These arguments prove that the rationale for states to get involved in the cross-border cooperation sets in common policy incentives, economic stimulus and local-level solutions.

Interrelation between Cross-Border Cooperation and Social Capital

Cross-border cooperation is one of the best routes to generate varieties of social capital in the peripheral border areas, where it facilitates collaboration between the communities. Explaining the entire proceeding of social capital formation requires defining of the real meaning of social capital and the ways how it comes from cross-border cooperation.

The literature on social capital suggests various understandings of it. The early record of social capital refers to the works of Karl Marx (1818-1883), Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), John Dewey (1859-1952), Georg Simmel (1858-1918), and Max Weber (1864-1920), where they clarified the significance of social and cultural dimension of economic growth. Later on, the concept was revised by Canadian sociologists (Seely et al., 1956), Jane Jacobs (1961), Glenn Loury (1977), Pierre Bourdieu (1986), James S. Coleman (1988), Robert Putnam (1994), Nan Lin (1999), and Francis Fukuyama (2001). The literature underlines the positive effects of social capital over political performance, democracy and crime reduction (Putnam 1994, 2000), educational attainment (Coleman 1988), healthcare, economic growth/poverty reduction (Narayan 1998), community development (Uphoff and Wijayaratna 2000), post-disaster community recovery/community resilience (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2011), favourable social climate in neighbourhood (Kleinhans, Priemus, and Engbersen 2007), confidence in institutions (Keele 2005), etc. There are also distinguished interrelated forms of social capital such as structural and cognitive[1] (Uphoff 2000), relational social capital[2], bridging social capital[3], bonding social capital[4] (Levy, Peiperl, and Bouquet 2013), linking

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[1] Structural social capital is related to the social structures that reinforce the social interaction, while cognitive social capital is related to the common ideology, values and norms that facilitate collaboration.
[2] Interpersonal relationships developed over time.
[3] Actual and potential resources embedded within the network of 'weak ties' (extensive and diverse low-density networks of acquaintances) and facilitates the broad identities and reciprocity among members. it refers to people and group who are not similar.
[4] Include the actual and potential resources embedded within the network of 'strong ties' (friendships, classmates or colleagues), typically characterized by trust, intimacy and reciprocity.

social capital[5] (Woolcock et al. 2004), transnational social capital[6] (Yasin, Quoquab, and Kamarudin 2016), horizontal and vertical social capital[7], formal and informal social capital, "politically relevant social capital"[8] (Ronald La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998), etc.

This thesis brings the most usable definitions and regards social capital as a phenomenon, which requires "an objective network of ties among individuals" (Paxton 2002, 256; Poder 2011, 348), institutional relationships of mutual recognition (Pierre Bourdieu 1986, 243), trustworthiness of social environment and closure of social networks (Coleman 1988; Coleman 1990; Putnam 1994; Knack and Keefer 1997, 2005), mutual trust and "civic virtue" (Putnam 1994; Fukuyama 2001) and investments in social relations (Lin 1999). Moreover, it acknowledges social capital as an outcome of both intentional (Burt 1992, Lin 2001) or unintentional activities, direct and indirect governmental involvements (Mirwaldt 2009), a side-effect of associational life and upshot of decentralization.

The central idea of both social capital and CBC lies in social interaction. It's an initial to produce social capital and fundamental prerequisite to flourish CBC. CBC incorporates both intra- and inter-community social ties at the local level of interaction in reality and facilitates face-to-face regular contacts across the borders. It brings people socially close that raise the level of trust among them and at the same time, the "radius of trust" defines the degree of social capital in the community.

Referring to Putnam's, Coleman's and others' logic on essentials to generate social capital, cross-border cooperation applies to many of them. CBC brings assets for communities located on both sides of border and leads to the common commitments and benefits to all (substantial social capital). In practice, it unifies people, community and agencies with diverse backgrounds from either side of borders (linking social capital), refers to the cross-border networks (transnational social capital), and facilitates reciprocal interactions between

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[5] Interlinks communities with different background, experience, status and location.
[6] Referring to the cross-border networks.
[7] Horizontal SC links people with similar status and vertical SC is about people belonging to different hierarchy.
[8] Makes citizens politically engaged.

people with similar characteristics ('bonding' social capital) and those with different identities ('bridging' social capital). CBC also incorporates community members who are either participant of formally established cross-border regional organizations, governed by specific rules and procedures (formal social capital) or united through the informal bonds and networking (informal social capital). Due to the fact that cooperation across borders is based on various common objectives and has multi-functional nature, it generates the most beneficial and tenable "mixed-motive based social capital'.

CBC creates the channels of social interaction across the borders and therefore, it contributes to the mobilization of social capital at local level. As a continuous process, CBC creates the favourable environment for both material (intensive economic exchanges, establishment of local business enterprises, tourism development, job creation and etc.) and immaterial forms (trust, shared values, common identity, reciprocity, confidence in neighbours, predictability) of social capital. CBC drives border settlers to bowling together in the community affairs and creates collective goods accessible to all. Therefore, like social capital, CBC should be identified as "collectively-owned asset"[9].

As Woolcock (1998) remarks, communities with high stock of social capital is safer, literate, more capable to resolve disputes and respond members' needs. CBC serves for the same objectives. It supports multi-sectoral cooperation between NUTS III border regions (pairs: EU-EU or EU-non-EU) to enhance the life quality of local adjacent communities. Moreover, 37.5 % of the EU population lives in the border areas defined by 38 international borders (EC 2015, 2). Accordingly, the study of CBC has practical outcome to identify local needs, outline common agenda for neighbours, and find optimal solutions.

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[9] The term is used by Pierre Bourdieu in his book "Distinction" (1984).

CBC Tops Policy Priorities of the Union

Since the late 1980s, European Union (EU) has elaborated different policy mechanisms to facilitate cross-border territorial cooperation. Opening-up of the Schengen internal borders as well as the formation of Euroregions have accelerated trouble-free interaction among neighbours across the borders.

CBC is one of the key elements of the current EU's agenda - Europe 2020[10]. The policy aims at achieving smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.[11] Under the inclusive growth, the EU fosters economic, social, and territorial cohesion. This latter underlines that gains and opportunities of economic growth must be spread to all parts of the Union, including peripheral regions (COM 2010, 16). The territorial cohesion actually reinforces "the principle of solidarity to promote convergence between the economies of better-off territories and those whose development is lagging behind", and also triggers all stakeholders to unleash the territorial potentials wherever they are located in (TA2020 2011, 3). The EU policies emphasize the need for the balanced and polycentric developments at all territorial levels (from supranational to local), as a key to deal with external shocks, core-periphery division, social exclusion, territorial polarization, regional disparities, environmental risks etc. The better-use of territory certainly contributes to economic progress, accessibility to public services, infrastructure, mutual trust-building, cultural or natural assets (ibid p. 4). Hence, in the EU policy, CBC emerges as a place-based instrument to make border areas functional and integrated, and to explore development potentials in closer cooperation with neighbours.

Besides the CBC within the EU (internal borders), policy makers at the EU level consider CBC the way for equal cooperation with non-members on the external frontiers.

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[10] It's EU's 10- year strategic development plan, which was adopted in 2010 by the European Commission.

[11] Smart growth increases the EU's performance in education, innovation, research, and digital technologies; sustainable development is related to the low-carbon economy, environmental protection, green technologies, resource efficient.

CBC initiatives were discussed in line with the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (2007-2013, ENPI). Now, it's a part of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI, 2014-2020), which supports the integration of adjacent border regions to bring neighbours together.

EU's Financial Contribution to CBC

From a financial standpoint, CBC truly deserves particular attention. In 1989-1993, CBC was initially supported within the Cohesion Policy, under the multiannual programme, which was focused on the less developed EU border regions (Medeiros 2013, 1). Later on, in response to the changed political and social composition of the Union in 1990s, EU initiated new financial umbrella programme INTERREG for border regions to deal with the challenges of European integration and enforce territorial cohesion. Hence, CBC is one of the three strands of the European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) INTERREG, known as INTERREG A. ETC INTERREG covers five programming periods from 1990 to 2020 and its budget has been increasing.

Table 1 – The Dynamics of the INTERREG Budget

EUR Billion

Note: Before 1999, the European currency unit (ECU) was the currency unit of the EC, then replaced by the euro, at a ratio of 1:1. Data is taken from the official portal of the European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/cooperation/european-territorial/, accessed on February 1, 2018

The budget for CBC INTERREG A is manifestly rising up. Within the INTERREG IV-A, the budget of EUR 5.6 billion was distributed to 60 cross-border programs along 38 internal borders (ERDF contribution). And, under the INTERREG V budget line, EUR 6.6 billion was allocated on the internal borders INTERREG A (60 cooperation programs). Regarding the external borders, EUR 242 million was earmarked under the IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) and EUR 634 million ENI (European Neighbourhood Instrument) cross-border collaboration programs. During the period of 2014-2020, 16 ENI CBC have been financed, including 18 EU members and 16 neighbouring partners such as Norway, Turkey and Russia (EUNeighbours 2018b).

Recently, in 2018, EU presented the new budget for 2021-2027 and turned its political priorities into financial terms. The Commission has introduced new "Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument" which includes CBC as a specific feature and amounts to EUR 89.5 billion (EUNeighbours 2018a; COM 2018). This new financial proposal again underscores the weight of CBC policy for the whole Union.

Paradigmatic Foundations of the Thesis

This thesis advantages the principles of polycentric paradigm to analyze the patterns of EU integration in the cross-border zones. Due to the ontological argument, polycentrism introduces the multiple realities, an idea of multiplicity of the self-sufficient forms of existence. From the epistemological stance, polycentrism applies to interdisciplinary approach and accordingly, methodological pluralism.

As a result of the recent global developments and accelerated regionalization around borders, particularly in terms of their territorial and spatial dimensions, state-centric paradigm (statism) no longer holds the monopoly in border studies. According to Scholte (2004), statism is the circumstance when all decisions and regulations are enforced by the territorial national governments, and regional or local governments do not have the respective autonomy and possibility to engage directly in the national policy-making. This condition has become vigorously challenged by the polycentric worldview. Recently, governance has become more multi-layered, cross-cutting, overlapping and occurred across different scales and layers from local to global, with involvement of state, non-state and private actors; this is called "polycentrism" (Scholte 2004, 3–4). This paradigm clearly demonstrates how the primacy of the state is re-positioned and transitioned in the certain aspects.

The application of this paradigm positively responds to the thesis in the following way: First, it underlines a wide range of borders in terms of their geographical/territorial features, social-political context, functional and spatial dimensions. Second, the thesis uses multiple methods to explain the transborder reality. Third, it's decisively related to the external validity of this study, like this paradigm prevents from further generalization and transferring of the research findings to other adjacent border regions.

Rationale behind the Concept of Multi-Level Governance (MLG)

The concept of multi-level governance fits well to the purpose of this study as it offers an exceptional way to study the dynamics of EU cross-border integration. The study of CBC decisively shows that it creates active policy spaces when cross-border actions are embedded in multi-dimensional relationships (Gualini 2003, 49). Therefore, this thesis uses the concept of multi-level governance (MLG) as a theoretical framework to explain the patterns of cross-border interactions among various actors over the Schengen internal and external borders.

There is no consensus among scholars on MLG is either theory or not. This thesis considers it as a useful concept rather than fully-fledged theory of integration. It's more mid-way conceptualization between the theories of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. It's usually criticized because of lacking a theoretical focus, does not explain the causes of why a concrete layer or actor of governance is dominant in cross-border practices. Regardless, MLG is a pragmatic tool of analysis to picture the complexity of the CBC.

MLG is a key principle of partnership, power delegation and coordination, where many actors operating at different territorial levels (from supranational to local) participate in each stage of policy doings. It takes advantage to explain the whole process of EU integration (and, accordingly, CBC) in more consistent way rather than other benchmark theories like neofunctionalism or liberal intergovernmentalism. On one hand, neofunctionalists support supranational style of decision-making, underline continuous "spill-over" effects of integration that incorporates "multiple, diverse and changing actors" involved to build transnational coalitions (E. Haas 1964, 68; Niemann and Ioannou 2015, 197). On the other hand, liberal intergovernmentalism considers that national preferences matter in decision-making, not international institutions. Even, the decision to delegate sovereignty, cooperate or establish international institutions is a collective by-product of "interdependent (strategic) rational state choices and intergovernmental negotiations" to secure bargaining agreements from potential uncertainty (Moravcsik 1998, 53; Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig 2009, 69). However, these theoretical lenses could not reflect the

complexity of developments in governance occurred in 1980s-1990s. And, the widespread of CBC in EU is an ultimate after-effect of these shifts[12] and reforms.

The reforms of 1980s-1990s modified the traditional mechanisms and forms of governance, and triggered the emergence of MLG as a toolkit to explain the policy dynamics inside EU. First, the reform of Structural Funds in 1988 underlined the importance of partnership and common coordination and required the cycles of administrative reforms for better management. Second, creation of a single market in 1992 and mobilization of interest groups within policy networks. Third, Maastricht Treaty and its central concept of 'subsidiarity' enforced the policy action at very lowest level (Bailey and De Propris 2002, 305; Stephenson 2013, 819). Unlike "simple polity" where influence and power is concentrated on a single level and mode of governance, MLG is a "compound policy" referring to the multiple levels (local, regional, national, transnational, global) and shifts in governance, corporatist policy-making, regionalized structures and involvement of public/semi-public/private sectors (Kersbergen and Waarden 2004, 143; Knodt 2004, 703; Bache 2010, 2). In brief, Knodt (2004) summarizes features of MLG as follows: first, it's polycentric, where hierarchical system is replaced by functional networks; second, governance is divided into multiple and overlapping arenas; third, it supports heterogeneity of political communities based on knowledge accumulation and collective learning.

The EU's current spatial agenda contests the traditional concept of state territoriality and facilitates emergence of MLG in cross-border regions. The success of CBC implies complex horizontal, vertical, subnational, and inter-sectoral interrelations that requires a comprehensive multi-level analysis (J. Blatter 1997, 157). Therefore, this thesis regards MLG as purposeful to analyze the CBC dynamics in Estonian border regions. However, it questions which type of MLG better explains the cross-border reality of the eastern and southern

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[12] Upward vertical shift from nation state to international and supranational institutions; Downward vertical shift from nation state to sub-national and regional levels; Horizontal shift from public to private, semi-public organizations; Mixture of vertical-horizontal shifts (Bache 2010).

adjacent regions. MLG Type I makes a particular focus on territorial mode of governance, while Type II emphasizes on a functional mode of governance.

These models represent two alternatives of how the jurisdictional borders should be constructed, like they should be delegated to a particular community (MLG I) or designed around a specific policy (MLG II), or should they bundle competencies (MLG I) or be functionally precise (MLG II), or should be limited in numbers (MLG I) or widely proliferate (MLG II), should they be more long-lasting and stable (MLG I) or fluid (MLG II), and etc (Hooghe and Marks 2002).

MLG Type I includes limited territorial jurisdictions with bundle of responsibilities, though the allocation of policy competences across the jurisdictional levels is flexible. In this type, a citizen refers to a particular territorial jurisdiction that is stable for decades. MLG Type II is completely different, as there are functionally specific jurisdictions, for example, dedicated to policy problems like explicit local demands of citizens - solving common water, schooling, healthcare or fire problems of inhabitants or implementing micro-projects, etc. The existence of such jurisdictions is more need-based, not fixed in time.

Under the type I, jurisdictions at the same level do not intersect and enjoy the principle of exclusivity. On the contrary, Type II regards hierarchical and non-intersecting structure as costly and irrational, and is in favour of jurisdictional border crossing and overlapping. Any kind of jurisdictional reforms under Type I is unusual, while in Type II a new problem-driven and functional jurisdiction is usual to establish. Type II jurisdiction is very typical for the cross-border regions of the western European countries. For instance, the cross-border zone of Germany, France, Denmark and Netherlands are covered by the problem-driven, goal-oriented transnational and *ad hoc* jurisdictions in the forms of interregional meetings, agencies, consortiums, commissions, inter-city groups, inter-communal partnerships of professional unions, etc. and are alternative to traditional multi-task governments. As they operate to provide public goods, while MLG Type I serves to sustain a political class who mediate the needs of citizens. Moreover, Type I express the

needs of the citizens of a particular community, sharing the same territory, identity, ethnicity or religion, while Type II is all about the individuals sharing the same functional space. Unlike Type I, Type II does not have system-wide architecture, as operation and scope of functional jurisdictions commonly fluctuate.

MLG tends to overcome the coordination dilemma. The two types solve this dilemma in different ways: while Type I minimizes the number of jurisdictions that should be coordinated, Type II curtails the interdependence among them.

The detailed difference of these models enables to explore the patterns of CBC over the eastern and southern borders of Estonia.

Research Question

This thesis asks which type of MLG explains the cross-border reality at the internal frontiers and external edges of the Schengen zone, reflecting on the case of Estonia.

The case of Estonia is unique to study due to several reasons. First of all, its southern border with Latvia belongs to the Schengen internal frontier, while the eastern border with Russia is the Schengen external border. The Estonian border regions differ in terms of economic, ethnic, political, social, and demographic performance. In full compliance with EU policy priorities, Estonia is involved in the CBC with Latvia to transform the peripheral border area into a zone of contact. While the 'four freedoms' are guaranteed in the south, the eastern border is a matter of everyday border-crossing check points and smart surveillance. According to the definitional debates over the variety of borders (sub-chapter 1.1.3.), this thesis identifies Estonian border with Latvia as open (a subject of free movement and mobility), and external Schengen edge with Russia as a controlled border (a subject of checking). The question studies the inter-linkage between the types of borders and the types of cross-border reality they create by using the realm of MLG model.

This case enables to analyze how cross-border practices are being implemented inside and outside of Schengen, which type of MLG occurs, which actors and levels of jurisdictions contribute, and how.

Methodology and Operationalization

This thesis uses qualitative research methods: document analysis, process tracing, case study and semi-structured interviews (Annex 1 – questionnaire). Whereas it was impossible to carry out interviews, the study applied e-mail correspondence as a tool to collect data. The primary (semi-structured interviews, e-mail correspondence) sources are supplementary to the secondary (peer-review articles, books, reports, and reliable internet data) sources to provide the holistic picture of this study. The paper exploits semi-structured interviewing due to two reasons: first, it's more convenient that allows respondents freedom to express their opinions through open-ended questionnaire. Second, the process of interviews is set in line with the pre-designed guideline to cover the core-line of this study. Regarding the e-mail correspondence, the rationale lies in its cost-effectiveness. It helps to reduce the field cost (travel to Narva College located in Narva City, Estonia) and to avoid the application to the Russian visa (travel to Russian border city Ivangorod). Therefore, use of both methods is purposive to the objectives of this study. Furthermore, the use of single case study as a qualitative research method enables to explore the CBC in the specific Estonian real-life context. This method helps keep focus on the small geographical area and a particular CBC dimensions.

The e-mail correspondence and semi-structured interviews were carried out with Estonian state ministries and local municipality officials, representatives of non-state actors, educational institutions, and the secretariat of EU-backed CBC programmes. The field research was carried out in Tallinn, Narva and Valga. In total, 2 e-mail correspondences and

8 semi-structured interviews were recorded in three months (November-January, 2017-2018). The field research was carried out with officials from the Ministries of Interior and Finance[13] in Tallinn (December 8, 2017 and January 9, 2018), representatives of local municipalities of Narva (November 14, 2017), Valga (December 12, 2017), and Ivangorod (e-mail correspondence, December 27, 2017), NGO representatives (November 20, 2017), EST-LAT program secretariat (December 4, 2017), Valga Vocational Training Centre (December 12, 2017), and Narva College (e-mail correspondence, December 27, 2017).

The leading methodologists (Morse 2000; Guest, Bunce, and Johnson 2006; Mason 2010; O. C. Robinson 2014; Gentles et al. 2015) have diverse opinions on the sampling[14] size in the qualitative studies. Even, there are no empirical arguments, practical guidance or "all-catching" method to estimate sample size for qualitative research. Instead, this thesis uses "data saturation" as a guiding methodological principle. The concept of saturation refers to the condition when study becomes "counter-productive", repetitive, and the collection of new data does not necessarily add "the new" to the overall story (Mason 2010, 3; Marshall et al. 2013, 11). So, sample size itself is not central to this study, but it's likely more focused to generate qualitative rich data to provide the credible analysis of Estonian cross-border reality.

In view of that, to achieve data saturation, this thesis is focused on the followings: scope of the study, nature of the topic, quality of data and study design (referring to Morse 2000, 3–4) and richness of the data (referring to Fusch and Ness 2015, 1409). Accordingly, the sampling strategy of the thesis goes along the geographical extent of the case (Estonia's border regions in the north and south), quality of data (each interviewee provides usable amount of data) and sample profile (interviewees were recorded with representatives of the different sectors, directly involved in the implementation of the cross-border programmes on

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[13] Two interviews were recorded with the representatives of the Regional Development Department of the Ministry of Finance, responsible for Estonia-Latvia and Estonia Russia cross-border cooperation programmes.

[14] Herein, "sampling" refers the selection of the sources to collect data.

the northern and southern borders of Estonia). This strategy enables to provide sufficiently extensive data to answer the research question.

With the purpose to improve the internal validity of this study, it utilizes *triangulation* as a strategy. Referring to the records on triangulation as a rational technique by Webb et. al. (1966), Campbell and Fiske (1959), Denzin (1978), Mathison (1988), Creswell (2003), Cho & Trent (2006), Bauwens (2010), etc., this thesis applies to the *triangulation by method* (use of multiple methods to fill the shortcomings of a single method), *triangulation by data source* (cross-verification of different sources) and "thick description" (construction of the text where rich description is in harmony with analytical interpretations) to establish holistically valid results.

To acknowledge the limitations of this research, it has time and financial drawbacks, which make it unattainable to conduct case-to-case comparative study. On the other side, this opens up the opportunity for further discussion to make the findings of this thesis transferable to other cross-border contexts (thus also facilitates the external validity of the study).

Pre-Research Assumptions

The core argument of scholars in favour of multi-level governance is that it supports more decentralized jurisdictions that better reflect the preferences of citizens and policy commitment. The two models of MLG undoubtedly provide the scale flexibility, but also have distinctive virtues (Marks and Hooghe 2003). The pre-research assumptions are based on the key distinctive characteristics the models have.

- Type I is about the diffusion of authority (power-sharing) at a limited number of jurisdictions at a limited territorial level, like international, national, regional, meso and local levels. These jurisdictions handle a package of functions and the boundaries of these jurisdictions do not overlap. The membership is typically territorial; this is

the case when there is the only one jurisdiction at a particular territorial scale, and existence of such jurisdiction is long-lasting. The unit of analysis is an individual government. This type shares the basic characteristics of Federalism as a decision-making power is distributed from the national to subnational governments. This type is about the case when local governments have a wide-spread function to care for local community, so called general-purpose jurisdiction.

- Type II describes the task-specific independent jurisdictions, the number of such jurisdictions and their operational scales vary and are numerous. Such jurisdictions could be created at any time whereas it's needed and their existence tends to be fluid. In this case, the unit of analysis is a specific policy. The smaller jurisdictions are not nested in the hierarchical structure, but act independently to generate public goods. In this type, there is no primacy of any authority or territorial scale, but a wide range of actors operating at various scales serve for distinct need-based functions. The public-private partnerships are characterized for Type I, but they are considered as equal partners in the Type II, collaborating by side-stepping the national governments.

Based on the mentioned above, the thesis develops the following assumptions:

In a model of layer cake:

- An interviewee from a single layer of government should evaluate its role and impact on cross-border practices rather than other governmental tiers; accordingly, in terms of zero-sum logic, other levels of governments should have no impacts ("Russian Doll");
- Because CBC carries features of locality, the local layer of government makes final decisions over cross-border policies or is a leading actor of cross-border practices; it does not recognize the necessity of cross-border policy co-ordination with other

governmental levels (or there is considerably little need of inter-governmental management).

In a model of marble cake:

- The role and impact of four layers (EU, national, subnational, and local) on cross-border practices should be evaluated as equally significant, blurred and functionally overlapped in certain fields;
- Practically, it seems impossible to prioritize impacts of different levels on cross-border practices in an accurate order;
- Alongside formal governmental institutions, non-governmental and private sectors are also essential players in this game.

	Levels of Governance[15]	Case of Estonia	Impact	Multi-Level Governance
Vertical	Supranational	EU Policy Umbrella	Direct or Indirect Impact	Layer Cake Marble Cake Interpretations
	National	Inter-state relations with Russia and Latvia		
	Sub-national/Regional*	Ida-Viru County (Northeast Border) Valga County (South Border)		
	Local/Municipal*	Narva, Valga - Ivangorod, Valka		
Horizontal	Intertwined Engagement of public-private-non-profit sectors	Observation at both northeastern and southern borders of Estonia		

Research Outline

*Note: we can say that Estonia has two-level administrative system. The division of power occurs between local level guaranteed by the Constitution and central (national) level. The Constitution of Estonia §154 and §155 states that local matters are handled by independent local authorities and "the entities of local self-government are rural municipalities and cities". They form the first and lowest administrative level. The second level is national government. The regional governance units like counties are not considered as administrative level, but rather subordinated parts of the central state operating at the regional level. The county governors were invited to take part in the interview, but they didn't express the interest.

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[15] Due to the different use of the term "governance", this thesis refers to the highly-sited papers of Rhodes (1996), Hyden (2002), Folke et al. (2005) and Börzel (2010). It's related to minimal state, corporate governance and new public management (Rhodes 1996). Typically, it's about the process to exercise policy and power, and may operate at any scale. For instance, Folke et al. (2005) explain that governance comes out from state-society context and "involves polycentric institutional arrangements, which are nested quasi-autonomous decision-making units operating at multiple scales" (p. 449). Hyden (2002) considers that governance gives the opportunity to rethink multi and cross-scale relations in line to benefit individuals and communities. Börzel (2010) regards governance as an effective way to solve problems of governments and highlights non-hierarchical modes of coordination and involvement of non-state actors in the policy-making (Börzel 2010, 5).

Thesis Structure

The introduction part of this thesis has twofold objectives: First, it gives the overall overview on what about the research is. Second, it attempts to capture a reader's interest. This part of the thesis is informative which tells about the weight of the topic, research statement, theoretical premise, methodology and methods.

The chapter I is introductory that strives to provide the comprehensive understanding over developments in border studies. This chapter is split into three parts: The first sub-chapter of the thesis discusses the early and current development of border studies in details. It brings the records of the distinguished authors together and analyzes how the meaning and functions of borders have been shifted over time, starting from the Roman Empire up to now. First of all, it clarifies gradual move of scholars from the discussion of the geographical and historical features of borders towards more functional dimensions. Second, it distinguishes the stages of development (around the World War I, then 1930s, 1950s, 1970s, 1980s and since 1990s) in border studies. The tracking of traditional and postmodern discourse on borders enables to identify the focus the researchers have had in the certain period of time. Besides, this sub-chapter describes the varieties of borders and recognizes the many-sided features of them. Furthermore, the first sub-chapter tells how IR dominant paradigms (realism, transnationalism and globalism) distinguish the role and functions of borders. Moreover, this part of the thesis analyses the drawbacks of border theorizing and favours more case-based study. As a very final point, this section studies the EU's geostrategies towards its both internal and external frontiers. The discussion of the EU's geopolitical models and geostrategies enables to have full picture on how the EU perceives its role inside and beyond its borders.

The second sub-chapter is devoted to the study of CBC. It defines CBC, tracks its emergence, and discusses the causes behind its success and failure. This section goes in details to explain EU's incentives to promote CBC and clarifies the EU's CBC supportive policies

from the 1990s up to 2020. Moreover, it shows how fully fledged theories - neofunctionalists, intergovernmentalists and constructivists - explain CBC, however, underlines the advantage of multi-level governance.

The third sub-chapter measures theoretical and empirical inputs this thesis makes to border studies. The first chapter is meaningful to the entire thesis. Based on the study of huge volume of literature, it coherently represents the whole line-up that helps the research.

The second chapter creates the conceptual framework for this thesis and deeply explains how multi-level governance undermines the Westphalian principles of sovereignty. It chronologically introduces the EU fundamental treaties which contribute to multi-level policy in EU. Referring to the key research question, the chapter clarifies the distinguished features of the MLG I and II types. As a final point, this chapter underlines the territorial dimension of MLG and explains why this concept is well-fitting for CBC studies.

The third chapter is case-focused. The case tells in depth the history and present of Estonian eastern and southern borders. This section clarifies all critical adjustments occurred in the cross-border regions from early 1920s, covering political, social, demographic and economic aspects. Moreover, this part identifies all internal and external actors somehow involved in the real-life context of the border neighbours. The third chapter incorporates the empirical findings of the interviews and brief concluding remarks. Accordingly, this section is of importance to demonstrate how EU, national, subnational/regional and local levels as well as non-state actors are involved in the cross-border practices, and which type of MLG it responds.

And, the last chapter is the conclusion of the thesis, which summarizes the most important points of the study.

The components of the structure provide enough context and evidences to make meaningful analysis.

Chapter I: Setting the Scene

1.1. Border Studies in Historical Perspective

1.1.1. Shifting Meaning of Borders

"Borders are no longer only national, but may take many different forms"

(Rumford 2006)

The earlier border studies were largely circumscribed around geography and history. During the Roman Empire[16], boundaries referred to the hierarchy of space and an outer frontier was established as a dividing line between civilization and barbarism (Laine 2015, 16). Later in the Middle Ages, Europe's population was organized through chattels with fuzzy boundaries. Though, geographers managed to develop the mapping technology and rulers were allowed to have the spatial view of their territory (ibid. p.16). For a long period, historians, geographers and other field scholars identified borders as fixed and stable dividing lines on the ground and didn't pay much attention to the role of boundaries in organization, construction and re-production of social life (Paasi 1998, 69). The weighty shift in border studies was triggered by Geographer John House and Social Anthropologist Fredrick Barth. They analyzed the impacts of remote/peripheral geographical location of border areas on the territories nearby and far away, and also identified complex process of border-generating (Jones 2009, 180; Meena 2014, 63).

In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia[17] supported territorial demarcation and self-determination, and established the modern boundaries of sovereign European states. The Treaty of Westphalia established the dominance of the horizontal view of the space of states (Soja 2005, 20). As a result, our knowledge became largely developed within the state-centered narratives. The Westphalian system of nation states and its exclusive "gate-keeper-

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[16] III-IV centuries.
[17] The peace treaties were signed in 1648.

role" of domestic and international politics have then been challenged by the European path of de-bordering of the world of states ("spaces of places" transformed into "spaces of flows") everywhere (J. K. Blatter 2001a, 176; Vayrynen 2003, 27). Furthermore, the Westphalian state-centric system has been repelled by the emerging discourse on "multi-level governance". Since then, territory has not been perceived as the only imaginable basis to define political communities (J. K. Blatter 2001a, 201).

Nowadays, as a multi-layered and multi-dimensional social phenomenon, the concept of border has been evolved with reference to historical, (geo) political and global trends. Globalization has definitely broken state-centered understanding of bordering and created a rationale for trans-national approaches and studies in general (W. I. Robinson 1998, 562–66). The traditional assumptions on borders as "fulfillment of a historical destiny" have been criticized (Paasi 1998, 69). The new political reality, capitalism and impact of global interactions have swelled up political, economic, cultural, informational, and human flows across borders. This has challenged the role of the state, and boundaries emerged more dynamic rather than locked physical limits. However, borders still carry many of their traditional functions (such as defense edges and/or territorial limit of state sovereignty), are largely linked to the idea of sovereignty and state territoriality, but operate in a different global context (Paasi 1998, 72). In our time, borders have become more permeable to all forms of movement: trans-boundary mobility of people and economic flows bolstered. The borderlands have turned into a significant spatial unit of analysis (Newman & Kliot, 2000, p. 12).

The literature on border studies explains and defines the meanings of border in different way. Paasi (1998) conceptualizes borders as:

1. **Process** exists in socio-cultural actions and discourses;
2. **Institutions** that exist simultaneously on various scales, aim at establishing stable structures for human interactions;

3. **Manifestations** of social practices, provide normative patterns for social interaction and collective identity; pools of emotions, fears or memories that could be swiftly activated for both progressive and regressive purposes;

The functions of borders have been extended. Paasi marks that borders act out as "discursive or emotional landscapes of social power" and "technical landscapes of control and surveillance" (C. Johnson et al. 2011, 62). For more clarification, under the "discursive or emotional" label of border, he refers to the nation-building and nationalistic features with material manifestations, and "technical landscapes of control and surveillance" is associated with biometrics and devices which strengthen bordering in a society. Regarding the equivocal nature of borders, Balibar underscores over-determination, polysemic and heterogeneity (Balibar 2002, 79–85). **Over-determination** emphasizes that borders are determined in multiple ways and every border has its own history. **Polysemic** nature underlines that borders are distinct entities for everyone. **Heterogeneity** highlights that border practices are performed at different sites.

Cooper and Perkins (2012) regard that meaning of border comes from the experiences of people living in and/or around. Newman emphasizes the never-ending influence of bordering on daily life practices. So, the authors review borders as an integral piece of cultural landscape (Paasi 1998; Newman 2006b; Cooper and Perkins 2012b). Remarkably, Rumford argues that borders are recognized, constructed, treated and experienced in a different way, according to the functions people attribute to them. Edward W. Soja defines borders as "life's linear regulators, framing our thoughts and practices into territories of action that range in scale and scope … from local to global" (Soja 2005, 33). Furthermore, Oommen tracks the historical development of political boundaries over the centuries and concludes that boundaries are in flux, endlessly contested, and not abolished (Oommen T.K. 1995, 149). As Shields formulates, "borders may be erased, even superseded in a manner that erodes their relevance even in abstract theoretical terms, but if not forgotten, a border

retains a virtual existence which holds the potential to be actualized in the future" (Shields 2006, 225).

Newman examines border as a major attribute to the political, economic and, global changes in the contemporary world. He identifies three features of territorial behaviour which have immortal impact to analyze the role of borders (Newman 2005, 3):

1. Territorial Scale - political organization of space is not limited to a state, but evenly impacted by daily behavior and practices at the local /micro level (e.g. daily social interaction in the cross-border regions);

2. Intangible and Symbolic Dimensions of Territory – territory has symbolic value which generates the feelings of territorial belonging;

3. All debates over territory must be concerned with the role of borders.

In brief, the concept of borders goes beyond the traditional explanations and requires more contextual approach.

1.1.2. 'Traditional' and 'Postmodern' Approaches

Due to its many-sided nature, border studies has been developed in parallel by scholars from political science, sociology, anthropology, economics, geography, history, etc. (Anssi Paasi 2005, 665–67).

Kolossov (2005) differentiates four stages of development in border studies, divided in 'traditional' and 'postmodern' approaches. The 'traditional' approach incorporates the historical, typological, functional and political mapping of borders, while 'postmodern' is mostly about the developments in the 1990s and the present decade (Kolosov 2006):

The historic-cartographic approach (since late 19th century) refers to the mapping of the boundaries, the study of their morphological and social features in time and space, demarcation, allocation, and delimitation after the First World War. The typological approach contributes to border studies at the national, regional and local levels, with special

emphasis on the interaction with neighbours (Kolossov 2005, 607–13; Newman 2006a, 179–81). This approach contributed to the classification of borders in accordance with the natural properties or historical circumstances. By the 1930s, August Losch and Walter Christaller, the fathers of location theory, analyzed the negative and positive consequences of borders for the local industry, political-administrative arrangements, and urban settlements (Anderson, O'Dowd, & Wilson, 2003, pp. 5-6). Consequently, they developed the idea of protectionism when borders were regarded as strict barriers to economic integration.

The functional approach (since the early 1950s) was developed after the Second World War (WWII). Here, researchers emphasize the functional, political, and territorial factors of boundaries, implications of trans-boundary flows and cross-border cooperation. The functional approach was used to explain social processes in the border areas (Kolossov 2005, 608). The functional classification distinguishes borders as barriers, contacts, and filters. As a barrier, it separates the economic, political, cultural, legal, and other spaces of the neighbouring countries as well as decreases the everyday contacts between the border neighbours. Under contact label, borders serve as a zone of contact between neighbouring countries for joint control of flows. And, as a filter, borders are formed to sort out the flows and/or social interactions.

The political approach (since the 1970s) in border studies was developed by political scientists. They clarified the functions of state borders through the main paradigms of international relations (ibid., p. 612). While "realism" considers borders as strict dividing lines separating the sovereign states, "liberalism" regards them as actors facilitating contacts and boosting interactions (they were more focused on the bridging functions of borders). At this stage of development, social scientists started to study the role of state borders in international conflicts, evolution, and resolution of border conflicts.

These traditional approaches became futile to explain border changes in the wake of the 1980s. At this period, border studies became influenced by the theory of world systems,

the idea of interdependence and different spatial scales. The world system theory supported the study of territorial boundaries at three levels - global, national, and local. This time, border studies generated the huge understanding of local communities with unique border identities.

Since the 1980s, economic growth and exchange of productions have boosted the significance of borders and bordering regions. The transboundary systems have increased mutual trust between bordering neighbours and inter-ethnic marriages, and fostered the abolition of the traditional boundary controls (ibid., p. 609). The globalization discourse[18], technology boom and free flow of global capital have steadily made borders open and their barrier-impacts become insignificant (Newman 2006a, 181). The urban agglomeration, industrial boom, mutual trust-building, disappearance of secular negative stereotypes, and intensive economic exchange have fostered the demilitarization of borders, the elimination of old border control mechanisms, the emergence of modern techniques, and de-securitization (Kolosov 2006, 14). Following the end of the Cold War, border scholars became more interested in the social production of borders, understood them as social institutions, and viewed them as rational, not given (Laine 2015, 30). As Henk van Houtum emphasizes, borders are endlessly socially (re)produced in and through bordering practices; "A border is a verb" (Prokkola 2011, 320). Or in other words, they are rather permeable asymmetric membranes which channel inward and outward flows of information, goods and people (Cooper and Perkins 2012b, 56).

Since 1990, the concept of "borderless world"[19] has been debated. But, this concept isn't acceptable for all scholars. For instance, Newman argues that "we do not live in a "borderless" world" and "territories, as boundaries, remain spatially differentiated, with some becoming more permeable, while at one and the same time, others are being constructed as part of a process of conflict resolution and are almost automatically becoming sealed"

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[18] Which was common in the 1980s-1990s.
[19] The term was popularized by Kenichi Ohmae.

(Newman & Kliot, 2000, p. 12). Ohmae describes the world as "an increasingly borderless place.., but not completely border free". He states that national states still maintain control over the movement of goods and people because of public safety and security (Ohmae 2007, 20). According to Ohmae, a "borderless world" has four distinctive features (Yeung 1998, 294):

1. Investments are not geographically constrained, capital flows effortlessly;
2. Industry is more globally-oriented;
3. The technology boom has enabled the global "placeless" companies to function virtually;
4. Consumers have become global in their taste and orientation.

The discussion over the "borderless world" has given way to a "world of borders" debate, when state borders have been discussed as one type among many (Meena 2014, 65). Consequently, other borders are located between among neighborhoods, localities, cities, regions, macro-regional and micro-regional blocs, religious, cultural and civilization groupings, etc. (ibid.). Another concept developed by Martinez was "borderlands milieu", which highlights special characteristics of people settled in the borderlands and identifies the characteristics which made them unique.

The postmodern approach hasn't totally solved the methodological and analytical problems in border studies, but it has truly outlined a new lineup for scholars in limology[20]. Together with traditional approaches, the postmodern approach helps to understand how political discourse determines the role of boundaries and transboundary interactions in domestic and foreign politics. As a final point, border scholarship is now particularly focused on the non-state, sub-state and trans-state actors' having impact on the boundaries. Borders have become defined as pathways to positive interaction rather than static outcome of political processes or lines on the ground limiting state sovereignty. In our time, global

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[20] Border Studies.

trends and unprecedented human mobility across borders have totally shifted traditional perceptions on borders. Instead, transboundary movements and relations, re-bordering and de-bordering dynamics, and border identity formation have topped the border scholarship (Warr and Schofield 2005, 653–55).

1.1.3. Border Typology

The typology and classification of borders are practical to explore variety of borders and analyze how boundaries are configured. Moreover, this definitional sorting helps use the appropriate terminology to label the borders of Estonia.

Many scholars differentiate the terms "border", "boundary" and "frontier". Rob Shields (2006) clarifies "border" with respect to the territorial and material cases (a state border); a "flowerbed planted along the edge of a property", while boundaries mark borders or edges; they are typically interchangeable in the practical discussions (Shields 2006, 224). Parker & Nissen interpret borders in the larger context of boundaries ("more formalized and territorialized sub-category of 'boundaries'") and conclude that the key distinction lies in their visibility - "for boundaries can be invisible whereas borders cannot be" (Meena 2014, 71). More concretely, all borders are boundaries, not all boundaries are borders (ibid). Whereas borders are strong material edges, boundaries have signs of virtuality and abstraction (Shields 2006, 227). The term "frontier" refers to what is "in front", called as foreland or borderland and outer-oriented, lawlessness; "boundary" applies to the concept of the state as a sovereign unit and inner-oriented, orderliness (Kristof 1959, 269). According to Giddens cited in Rajah, frontier is a peripheral region of a state "where the political authority of the center is diffuse or thinly spread" and border is defined as a "geographically drawn line separating and joining more than two states" (Rajah, 1990, p. 122). For more clarification, *boundary* is a legal concept which separates state structures as well as bounds what is inside; *frontier* is a broader term, "zones of varying width, either political or cultural in nature" (Jańczak 2014, 9).

It seems easiest to identify natural boundaries, because they follow the natural landscape features, while geometric boundaries cover both natural and cultural traits, and ethnographic boundaries originate from multiple traits such as language, religion, etc. (Konrad & Nicol, 2008, p. 24). According to the redistribution of border functions, de jure (political or administrative) and de facto (ethnic, linguistic, cultural or "civilizations") are distinguished (Kolossov and O'Loughlin 1998). The authors determine de jure as inwardly-oriented lines of separation, an essential component of state sovereignty. On the contrary, de facto is an outwardly-oriented zone of contacts – "frontiers".

One of the famous typology of borders is offered by Richard Hartshorne under the terms "antecedent", "subsequent", "superimposed" and "natural" borders. In his typology, "antecedent" borders are boundaries delimited prior to the settlement of the area; "subsequent" borders were defined due to the existing ethno-territorial patterns; "superimposed" borders are demarcated by outsider (colonial power) and "natural" borders enclosed with the physical features of the landscape (Newman 2006a, 174).

The sociological categorization highlights borders as a line of separation between distinct entities and is expressed like "us"-"them", "include"-"exclude", and "inside"-"outside". Oommen (1995) distinguishes between historical (related to religion, colonialism, and history), hierarchical (differentiates between people), and ideological boundaries. He typifies territorial, temporal, ideological, hard/soft, permanent/ephemeral, sacred/secular, static and, dynamic borders. Oscar J. Martinez differentiates between alienated (unfavorable and tense conditions for cross-boundary interchange), co-existent (stability is on/off preposition, borders remain slightly open), interdependent (a border region of a state is symbolically linked with the bordering region of its neighbor), integrated (all troubles, disparities, and barriers are eliminated across mutual borders) (Martinez, 1994, pp. 1-4). Ingolf Vogeler classifies borders as hard (fenced and guarded), soft (regulated, but open),

open (no passports, no visas, no inspection), controlled (passport, inspections, visas required), and fortified (physical barriers, walls, militarized) borders (Payan 2014, 7).

The classification offered by Gerard Delanty is the most usable for this thesis. He categorizes hard, soft, open and close borders. Delanty defines hard borders as "military and political borders that separate states or state systems" and soft borders in cultural terms (symbolic boundaries between ethnic groups) (Delanty 2006, 188–89).

(Delanty 2006, 190)

Newman (2006) identifies a correlation between closed borders, political tensions, and alienated borderlands. He interlinks open borders, political cooperation, and integrated borderlands. Moreover, when the border is more open than closed, the borderland region is transformed into a "zone of interaction", where people communicate rather than break-up (Newman 2006a, 180). So, whereas a border is closed or open, it labels the degree of development of borderland. The opening of borders are regarded as positive factors to a good neighbourhood (Newman 2006b, 150). For instance, EU member states have more open borders than non-EU states, or the Schengen zone countries have more open borders within the agreement rather than outsiders. As an example of soft borders but closed to outsiders,

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Delanty names some kind of ethnic and religious groups. While having hard with an open access points, so called "smart borders" (ibid. p. 189).

The internal borders of the EU are daily becoming more porous. EU officials realized that the burden of "hard borders" at the outers will impose problems for both sides (EU members and neighbours) and it strives to "soften" the sharper external edges by developing networking opportunities under the "Neighborhood" policy (Rumford 2006, 161). We could argue that the greatest concentration of open borders is in the European Union, with a growing degree of permeability on the internal borders and hardening of the external borders (Blake, 2005, p. 17).

The strong arguments for open borders are to guarantee the freedom of movement to take up residence wherever or wealth distribution, which are restricted under closed borders, even in the case that no one desires to cross the borders (Lenard 2010, 630). Lenard confers that open borders favor those who have the desire to use their resources to cross the borders, for those who do not have resources at once and who would just like to test their fundamental rights of free movement. On the contrary, the supporters of closed borders often emphasize the need to preserve the public cultural values from newcomers crossing the borders.

Most EU states are currently in favor of open borders and consequently, provide free movement of capital, services, people, and goods. Those that uphold sealed and closed borders are severe barriers and create different social and political realities on each side of a fence (Newman 2003, 18). To the extent that borders are more enterable, it continually increases trans-boundary interfaces and collaboration in the neighbouring regions. As a result, people with different backgrounds become accustomed with each other, construct a favorable and beneficial multi-cultural landscape[21] and live in a shared environment.

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[21] This does not mean that their different peculiarities (cultural, religious, etc) are completely annulated, but they are mutually respected.

1.1.4. Border and IR Paradigms

The border functions could be analyzed through three IR paradigms: realism, transnational, and global. The dominant actors in each paradigm support the different perceptions over the given role and functions of borders, and consequent actions.

In the realism paradigm, the state is a main driver of IR, an exclusive territorial actor and power holder, responsible for sovereignty and national interests. For realists, borders are crucial to defend their material or cultural values, population, sovereignty, all type of goods and capital, etc. As a result, borders have disintegrative functions and are realized as defensive lines against potential threats. For realists, borders are fixed, unchangeable, and strictly defined physical lines.

The main logic behind transnational paradigm lies in significance of non-state actors and the idea of mutual interdependence/inter-connections. The transnational paradigm recognizes that transnational actors and process are displacing the state-centric system. According to the Kantian tradition, "international politics is characterized by transnational bonds that bind individuals across states and nations" (Chatterji 2013, 15). Human beings, as rational actors, have similar interests and are keen on cooperation in accordance with moral imperatives. The proponents of the transnational paradigm argue that other important actors exist in the international system and relevant attention should be paid to the effects of transnational relations (Nye and Keohane 1971, 331). For transnationalists, social structure and capital are trans-nationalized. Herein, state boundaries are recognized as a bridge between different actors within the international system and open for never-ending flows of all kinds of goods and people.

The contemporary proliferation of international organizations, corporations, and a variety of human activism, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), idea of global citizenry and social movements have provoked the evolution of a global paradigm (Turner 1998, 25). Under the global paradigm, borders are just virtual lines on the map, less important, as they

do not imply barrier functions. Accordingly, all efforts are dedicated to creating a heterogeneous market and legal systems across adjacent borders.

Paradigm	Realism	Transnational	Global
Border Perception	Dividing line, determinant of nationality and separation	Porous line, an element of system enabling states of penetration;	Virtual line, a demarcating line seen only on the map, no states borders in favour of market borders
Border Importance	Very important, as a barrier against threats, guarding sovereignty, profitable element of a system, disintegrative function	Less important as a bridge between states and non-territorial actors, fragmegrative function	Not important, as a functioning barrier for international flows, integrative function
Action at Border	Infrastructure building, securitization of border when a conflict appears – militarisation of border	Gradual abolition of infrastructure, opening of channels for flows of goods, people, money, information	No infrastructure or not important, making heterogeneous market system and legal system

(Moraczewska 2010, 333)

1.1.5. Theorizing Borders

Because of the asymmetric and polysemic character, borders are experienced in a different way. It evidently seems hard to outline one "catch-all" theoretical framework embracing various types and forms of borders, their epistemological and ontological distinction. As Newman underlines, border studies are case-oriented and "have not been translated into the construction of meaningful boundary/border theory" (Cooper and Perkins 2012a, 58). Moreover, he underlines the multiplicity of borders in terms of geographical or spatial dimensions, or types and accordingly, the impossibility to generate a single set of explanatory variables (Newman 2003, 13). Furthermore, Brunet-Jailly emphasizes that "each border is unique, no taxonomy of borders is conceptually feasible because there are too many types of borders" (Moraczewska 2010, 330). Also, Paasi (1999, 2005) argues that the construction of a general border theory is undesirable for the following reason: individual

state borders have complex, contextual unique characteristics and a grand theory is not valid for all borders.

The theorizing of borders still stays problematic and open to scholars. Payan (2014) summarizes the problems of border theorizing in two-fold: structural and methodological (Payan 2014, 3): the structural troubles of border theorizing is related to its inter-disciplinary nature (scholars approach the border cases from the standpoints of their individual disciplines); and, the methodological problem is linked to the cross-case comparison and Large-N methodological approach. The best solution Payan offers is well-crafted typology[22] (and accordingly, comprehensive sets of variables). So, the use of typological theory supports to classify research variables, to draw generalizations, and to fill the theoretical gaps (ibid. p. 5).

Emmanuel Brunet Jailly suggests four effective analytical lenses to outline general theory of borders: 1. Market forces and trade flows; 2. Activities of multiple levels of governance on adjacent borders; 3. The political weight of borderland communities; 4. Cultural peculiarities of borderland communities (Konrad & Nicol, 2008, p. 50). In practical terms, these lenses are helpful to examine and analyze how border theory works.

Borders could also be theorized as a part of wider (re)production of territoriality, state, power, etc. (C. Johnson et al. 2011, 62). Moreover, Newman remarks that the border theories must explain the influence of borders on local everyday life, "Borders should be studied not only from a top-down perspective, but also from the bottom up, with a focus on individual border narratives and experiences, reflecting the ways in which borders impact upon the daily life practices of people living in and around the borderland and transboundary transition zones" (Newman 2006b, 143).

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[22] For clearness, Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George define typological theory "as a theory that specifies independent variables, delineates them into categories for which the researcher will measure the cases and their outcomes, and provides not only hypotheses on how these variables operate individually but also contingent generalizations on how and under what conditions they behave in specified conjunctions or configuration to produce effects on specified dependent variables" (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 235).

1.1.6. EU Geostrategies towards its Borders and Beyond

The EU is equally influenced by both its internal and external border regimes. The European borders are multi-functional. They play a key role in social and economic development or stagnation of borderlands in multiple ways. On one hand, European borders have been delegitimized in line with historical legacies and political reality[23]. On the other hand, some of the borders are being devalued as an outcome of the European integration process (Jańczak 2014, 8–9).

Christopher S. Browning and Pertti Joenniemi conceptualize the different geopolitical strategies/visions (geostrategies) of the EU towards its final borders and nearby (Annex 2). These geostrategies (Westphalian, Imperial and Neo-Medieval models) are crucial explanatory frameworks to analyze how the EU organizes its territories and space at the borders and beyond. The Westphalian Model is related to the characteristics of modern statehood, "as sovereignty is steadily moved away from the states to the Commission", power applies to the territory up to the border and what is left outside does not belong to the entity (Browning and Joenniemi 2008, 522; Jańczak 2015, 17). The backers of this model place emphasis on the EU's own currency (EUR), border regime (Schengen), common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and its strong incentives to have a single constitution and unified army. Nevertheless, the intergovernmental nature of the EU weakens the use of this model. In the Imperial Model, power is centered in Brussels and scattered out at multi-levels. This model follows the logic that the EU exists to bring stability, to organize space with moral prerogatives and spread European values beyond its borders. The imperial model considers the EU's outside as a source of threats. With the intention to provide internal stability, the Union tends to develop impermeable borders to exclude the danger. On the other hand, the EU strives to extend the system of the EU's governance outside its borders, as an effective tool to build a peaceful neighborhood. The European Neighborhood Policy and the Association Agreements, as a tool to provide stability at the outer borders without potential

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[23] For instance: the case of Yugoslavia, former Soviet republics.

rounds of enlargement, are the best examples of the imperial model. In addition, the interpretation and understanding of norms and values depends on the distance from a political-territorial center and the power of a center diminishes as the distance increases. Applying this model to the EU, the hard core of the Union includes the states which are members of the euro zone and the Schengen zone, and then there are also members that do not take part in the aforementioned two areas or in one of them (Jańczak 2015, 17). Under the Neo-Medieval model, a power is not centered on one core - Brussels, but regionalized, referring to the logics of trans-nationalism, network, and multi-level governance. Here, Finland's kick-off Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) is the best case to explain a decentralized Europe where regions have a voice in European border policies (Browning and Joenniemi 2008, 525; Jańczak 2015, 17).

Walters observes four geostrategies in EU border politics - networked (non) border, march, colonial frontier, and limes (Annex 3) (Walters 2002; Walters 2004; Walters 2006; Browning and Joenniemi 2008; Jańczak 2015): Under the networked border, the centers from both sides of the external border have close collaborative contacts and cross-border cooperation incorporates a number of actors. This geostrategy serves to remove dividing lines in the EU, to provide free movement of all goods and share responsibilities with others. March constitutes a buffer zone between two territorial-political structures to keep away disorder and insecurity[24]. March has dynamic nature – whenever outsider becomes insider, new buffer zone emerges.[25] Colonial Frontier refers to the transformation of outside with the preferences of inside and then its gradual absorption. And, the fourth geostrategy is limes which defines the limits of expansion, marks the territorial ends, and defends what is already achieved.

These geostrategies determinedly apply to the neighborhoods of the EU in multiple ways. For instance, the EU's Neighborhood Policy (ENP) appears to enforce the imperial

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[24] The German concept of *Zwischeneuropa*, which describes the Eastern European border separating Russia and West Europe, is a manifestation of this idea (Browning and Joenniemi 2008; Jańczak 2015).

[25] The EU enlargement of 2004 is the best example to observe the dynamic nature of *march.*

geopolitical characteristics of the Union. However, it also carries the features of other geostrategies. The rationale behind the ENP program is focused to preserve the EU's gains (limes geostrategy) and to create a buffer zone to the threat (March geostrategy). Unlike the eastern neighborhood of the EU, the southern borders are somehow fixed and refer to the lime geostrategy of the EU.

The main dimensions of the border debate in Europe include phantom borders, geopolitical boundaries, internal Schengen frontiers and external Schengen boundaries (Jańczak 2014, 14). Jańczak makes the distinction respectively (Ibid. p. 11-16): Phantom Borders manifest themselves as lines separating regions of different political preferences and grounds for local diversity (Liberal North and West Poland vs. Conservative South Poland, Pro-Western Ukraine and Pro-Russian Ukraine); they do not exist legally now but appear in different modes of social actions. European Geopolitical Boundaries include the Cold War borders. Internal Schengen Frontiers demonstrate the current border reality and outcome of the EU integration process, cross-border purposes and tendencies towards the lax border controls. External Schengen boundaries are linked to the fading of internal borders and re-frontierisation, which results in the hardening of the external borders of the Schengen Zone.

1.1.7. Concluding Remarks

Nowadays, borders are primary institutions of contemporary states, open to contestation and incorporate local, regional, state-bound, and supranational processes in complex ways.

Borders are not fixed ground-lines in time and space; they're just symbolizing social practices of spatial differentiations (van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002, 126). Moreover, bordering practices are not locked up to state space. Borders are gradually losing their splitting functions and are dynamically experienced by populations settled in the cross-border regions (Bioteau 2015, 5). For them, borders are "everyday boundaries more than the state boundaries" (ibid.).

Borders effect regional and local overall development. Since the 1990s, new world order has created a multidimensional spatiality and a complex regime of boundaries (Tuathail and Luke 1994, 152). Borders have become a flexible reflection of human behavior and the impact of globalization has modified the spatial configurations to a large extent.

As the "engine of connectivity", borders facilitate mobility of people locally and globally (C. Johnson et al. 2011, 67). Both "bottom up" (local) and "top-down" processes have ended up "territorial absolutism" that refers to the absolute control of the state through fixed territoriality (Newman 2005, 4). As Rumford re-affirms, bordering is not always the business of a state, but ordinary people are gradually involved in.

The models of EU's border geostrategies enable us to outline EU's policy inside and outside. Since the 1990s, the EU has increased financial support to regional cooperation and CBC in particular. The key objectives of the Union are to provide continuous cooperation between both sides of the border and to create a favorable economic environment for peripheral border zones. The establishment of "Schengenland" has accelerated the collaboration over the internal borders of the EU. Furthermore, the EU also contributes to cooperation across external borders.

1.2. Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) and Cross-Border Regions (CBRs)

1.2.1. Definition, Features and Impacts of CBC/CBRs in EU

"A bird flying over the Upper Rhine sees no borders. The challenge is how to make this happen on the ground"

Joachim Beck, Director, Euro-Institute, Germany

Starting from the Treaty of Rome[26], the boundless impacts of globalization and regionalization have supported the transcendence of borders, rise of regional, social and economic integration at macro and micro levels, and development of multiple channels and social networks (Hurrell 1995; Wilfred J. Ethier 1998; Sparke 2000; Vayrynen 2003; J. W. Scott 2015; Kang 2016). This infinite process has attributed diverse meanings to physical space and bolstered trans-border ties among neighbours. At macro-level, regional integration is manifested in collaboration among large-scale geographical areas (such as Mediterranean grouping), while at micro-level, it's related to the development of cross-border cooperation (CBC), cross-border regions (CBRs) and evolution of Euroregions[27] (Dočkal 2005, 2).

The EU is an excellent laboratory to explore how CBC has managed to change the perception of a state frontier, and brought new governance and economic development at micro level of interaction (C. M. Johnson 2009, 177; Kosov and Vovenda 2011, 5). While a state frontier was considered as one of the reasons for clashes, states rationally defined their domestic and international political preferences. Such traditional perception over state frontier still exists, but it's evidence-based that internal border-lines between EU states are

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[26] The Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 and led to the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC).

[27] The oldest CBR EUREGIO was established in 1958 on the Dutch-German border, included 140 local authorities, and was a legitimate agency (Perkmann 2007, 4). EUREGIO had its institutional structure like that of an executive board, council, secretariat and parliament. EUROREGIO was focused on local/regional infrastructure and other concerns abandoned by local elites and central state agencies. Nowadays, all European borders are predominantly covered by the CBRs under various names such as "Euroregions", "Working Communities", etc.

becoming ever more porous, while the external edges are increasingly hardened (Kosov and Vovenda 2011, 7).

There are varieties of explanation on cross-border cooperation and cross-border regions. Perkmann defines CBC as "more or less institutionalized collaboration between continuous subnational authorities across national borders" and determines the following four criteria of it (Perkmann 2003, 156): 1. It must be located in the realm of public agency; 2. It's about collaboration between sub-national authorities; actors aren't a legal subject to the international law, but so called "low politics"[28]; 3. It's focused on practical problem-solving; 4. Over time, CBC focuses on the stabilization of cross-border contacts through institutionalization. Schmitt-Egner characterizes CBC as micro-level interaction between neighbours for common governance and development of their living space, without further involvement of their central authorities (Schmitt-Egner, 1998, p. 63). Moreover, it's often considered as an underneath to build regional identity, which glues communities with diverse background together, supports the co-existence of local and national cultures, and assists actors in finding the common ground for their interests (Prokkola, Zimmerbauer, and Jakola 2015, 106).

Regarding the definition of CBRs, they are identified as transnational "spaces where nationally defined cultures, political systems, institutions, and economies meet", "action spaces/units", a bounded territorial unit incorporating distinct systems of two sovereignties, but functionally-interdependent adjacent territories (J. Scott 2002, 29; Perkmann 2003, 157). Maillat distinguishes both "cut-off effect" (zone of separation) and the "welding effect" (zone of contact) of CBRs. In case of "cut-off effect", dividing lines and different jurisdictions separate neighbouring regions, and under "welding effect", border comes out an area of contacts, where cross-border relations are being harmonized (Maillat 1992, 39). The

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[28] Moreover, in the late 1950s, "low politics" became a leading policy in the European states that supported regional integration. For more clarification, "low politics' is focused on the economic aspects of policy making, while 'high politics' concerns national defense and security.

characteristics the integrated CBRs may have are: manifested asymmetric relations, proximity-based economic flows (greater integration of economic systems), commuter labor flows (working in one state and living in another neighboring state), and different forms of collaboration/consultation (infrastructure, public transport programs, etc.) (ibid. p.40).

Institutionalization at the local or regional level is a requisite for successful CBC. The EU supports local and regional cross-border governance to integrate inter-state features. Euroregion is the best case of cross-border institutionalization, which diminishes barrier-effects of national borders and makes life easier (Dočkal 2005, 2). Besides Euroregions, Perkmann also discusses INTERREG-related structures and some governmental commissions[29] as examples of institutionalization in border area (Perkmann 1999, 4). Against, the failure of CBC is mainly rooted in non-existence of common legal framework among neighbours, lack of political will, finance and interests of regional and local authorities as well as prejudice/ unconsciousness of inhabitants living in the Euroregions (Dočkal 2005, 4).

1.2.2. Overview of EU's Support to Cross-Border Areas From 1988 up to 2020

The EU has many reasons to stimulate CBC: it strives to keep EU institutions closer to everyday life of people, to reduce disparities between the neighbouring regions[30], to alleviate undesirable effects of border opening, to eliminate the predominant core-periphery model and to promote a more balanced economic development (Terlouw 2008, 104; Garcia-Duran, Mora, and Millet 2011, 346; Banjac 2012, 43).

For that purpose, the EU has carried out various policy initiatives. For instance, in November 1988, the European Parliament highlighted the critical importance of common policies on reduction of regional disparities in its resolution on Community Regional Policy and Role of Regions. Moreover, the European Charter of Self-Government 1997 and later, the Warsaw Declaration of 2005 both underlined the value of transfrontier cooperation to

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[29]The governmental commissions do not intervene in the daily concerns, but sovereign states still overrule the CBC initiatives directly or indirectly through grass-roots programs, international treaties or other regulations.
[30] Particularly, the regional disparities are visible after the waves of EU enlargement.

build up EU without dividing lines and introduced the "principle of subsidiarity" (CoE, 2005). As well, the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) emphasized the keystones the CBC may rely on: partnership, subsidiarity, development of cross-border strategies and joint structures at the regional/local level (Eibler, Gilcher, and Ziener 2014, 51–52). The principles of subsidiarity and partnership are about the power-sharing between several levels of authority and autonomy of local authority in relation to central government[31].

EU continues to empower local actors in decision-making and has dramatically increased the support programs for cross-border communities (incorporating around 185 million EU citizens). For instance, from the 1990s onwards, European Territorial Cooperation known as INTERREG "offers a unique opportunity for regions and member states to divert from the national logic and develop a shared space together, build ties over borders and learn from one another. It is a laboratory of EU integration and EU territorial cohesion" (EC, 2011, p. 8). EU INTERREG is directed to both internal and external borders, with particular purpose to encourage entrepreneurship and local employment, social inclusion, education and to develop common space in the bordering areas (AEBR 2000). The programme incorporates five phrases: INTERREG I (1990-1993), INTERREG II (1994-1999), INTERREG III (2000-2006), INTERREG IV (2007-2013), INTERREG V (2014-2020). It includes three strands of collaboration: cross-border (Interreg A), transnational (Interreg B), and interregional (Interreg C). In 1990, 31 Interreg programs of CBC were established, with financial support of EUR 1.082 billion. Since then, the number of programs and funding have been increased about five times (annex 4 & 5 maps, CBC from 1989-2013/2007-13, (EC, 2011, pp. 11-13)). Mirwaldt et al. (2009) identified five outputs of INTERREG: 1. territorial cohesion; 2. specific territorial problems are tackled; 3. Learning and exchange educational

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[31] Hence, many EU states have delegated the respective competencies to lower level to implement regional policies, but some states still bargain to sustain their sovereignty and power of local policy implementation (Dudek, 2005, p. 7). Such attitude hinders joint vertical and multi-sectoral management of regional policies and delays the positive outcome.

opportunities; 4. connects different types of organizations; 5. accelerates the dynamics of cross-border contacts at national, regional, and local levels (Garcia-Duran, Mora, and Millet 2011, 346).

In 2007, EU established the new mechanism to enhance cross-border cooperation - European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), which is unique on account of enabling regional and local authorities to team up for cross-border cooperation (Zapletal 2010, 17; EC 2017; Caesar 2017, 247).

Through Pre-Accession Instrument-IPA[32], PHARE[33], TACIS[34], MEDA[35] and CARDS[36], the EU strives to eliminate disparities at their external borders to create a shared zone of stability and prosperity, and to increase integration at local level. In 2007-2013, CBC in the European neighborhood was implemented within the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The ENPI-CBC mainly introduced a new approach with integrated funding to improve the efficiency of CBC along the external borders.

Since 2014, the CBC under the ENI incorporates three overarching objectives (EEAS 2014): 1. to promote economic and social development on both sides of a common border; 2. to challenge in security, environment, safety and public health; 3. to ensure mobility of people, goods and capital.

Within the policies discussed above, the EU clearly expresses its commitment to increase the level of cooperation and develop functional economic links among the border regions. The quantitative analysis (Garcia-Duran, Mora, and Millet 2011, 359) of the CBRs in the EU-15 demonstrate that the funding of the European community actually helps cross-border cooperation and CBRs with a high degree of economic independence collaborate

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[32] Designed for countries determined to become members of the EU and from 2007, also covers potential members.
[33] PHARE was originally created for Poland and Hungary to cope with the transitional challenges. Later, the program was expanded to Eastern and Central Europe. In 2000, PHARE was converted into the pre-accession program and became supported by the Structural Instrument for Pre-Accession (ISPA) and the Special Accession Programme for Agricultural and Rural Development (SAPARD).
[34] TACIS was designed for the states which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, including Russia. Later, TACIS was replaced by the ENP, which is supported by the ENPI and then the ENI.
[35]Eastern and southern territories around the Mediterranean Sea.
[36] Western Balkan countries.

more effectively. Unfortunately, there is no common methodological approach to assess the impact of the EU's cross-border policies on territorial cohesion and measure the outputs because of the small-scale financial resources involved, and shortcomings in monitoring systems and data collection (ibid. p. 346).

1.2.3. How Leading Theories Explain CBC, Advantage of MLG

CBC is typically explained through three theoretical lenses: neo-functionalism, inter-governmentalism, and constructivism.

Neo-functionalists[37] (NF) underline the importance of the "spillover" concept into the EU integration process (E. Haas 1964; Gehring 1996; Tannam 2006; Jańczak 2016). For Ernst Haas, integration is "the process whereby actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new center whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Hurrell 1995, 348). In its classical formulation, the concept of 'spillover' has two forms: functional 'spillover' (arises from the economic sector) and political 'spillover' (Nugent, 2006, p. 562). The functional economic co-operation spills over towards political collaboration and other fields such as education, environment, and public transport, etc. For Haas, political integration is linked to the emergence of "a new political community", based on the anticipated shift of loyalty of elites from national to supranational settings (Gehring 1996, 230). Due to the neo-functionalist logic, establishment of over-arching institutions (cross-border institutions) to foster cross-border cooperation is principal, because 'bottom-up' cooperation would not occur in the absence of political institutional change (Tannam 2006, 273).

The NF accentuates the role of non-state actors, regional organizations, interested associations and social movements in the dynamics of regional integration. It emphasizes that states are still important actors in setting-up initial agreements, but they do not exclusively

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[37] Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg were two outstanding scholars, pioneers of neo-functionalism thinking.

determine the directions/extent of integration and subsequent changes (Schmitter 2002, 2). Accordingly, states deliver more autonomy to regional and local authorities. As Joseph Nye remarks, important actors in the neo-functionalist model are "integrationist-technocrats and various interest groups which get governments to create a regional economic integration organization for a variety of convergent aims" (Nye 1970, 799).

The NF model generates functional linkages of tasks, increases flows and transactions, deliberates linkages and coalition, creates economic pressure groups at the regional level, intensifies regional identity and involvement of external groups, elite socialization, and regional institutionalization (Ibid. p. 813).

All the above mentioned proves that abolishment of border control, customs and other barriers will enliven CBC. And, this is anticipated to 'spill over' to other thematic areas in the cross-border area.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI), born out of a critique of NF, is a "baseline theory" or "grand theory" of regional integration (Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig 2009, 67–68). This theory proposed by Stanley Hoffman heavily relies on the claims of realism and argues state pre-dominance in the process of integration (Hoffmann 1966). LI postulates: first, states, as rational and powerful actors, achieve their aims through intergovernmental bargaining and negotiations rather than under centralized authority (Andersson 2016, 41). Second, states are rational and international cooperation (like the establishment of international/supranational institutions) is a consequence of strategic/rational state preference and intergovernmental agreements (Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig 2009, 70–71). According to Moravcsik, EU integration is a sequence of the rational choice (economic and geopolitical national preferences) of member states.

The European integrationalists oppose the LI approach and favor supranational institutions, because "where we had relied on intergovernmentalism we have mostly failed" (Sutherland 2010, 418). Since the Maastricht Treaty c. 1992, the decision-making process within the EU has been based on two different logics: intergovernmental and supranational.

The single market policies ("low politics") are managed through supranational arrangement, while foreign, financial and security policies ("high politics") are exclusively controlled and coordinated by intergovernmental logics (Fabbrini 2013, 1007). In brief, in line with LI, CBC is a decisive privilege of states to uphold control over the cross-border interactions.

Constructivism argues that structure is a "set of relatively unchangeable constraints on the behavior of states" (Hopf 1998, 173). Accordingly, constructivists postulate: 1. that meaningful behavior or action is only apparent within inter-subjective social context; 2. actors build relationships and understanding of others due to practices, norms, and identity; 3. structure is meaningless without an inter-subjective set of norms and practices (ibid.)

Constructivists analyze the creation of institutions as a process of internalizing new understandings of self and other, a process of reconstructing their interests and shared commitments to social norms (Wendt 1992, 417). They identify moral dimension of social and political interaction too (Weber 2014, 519). In brief, by focusing on the impact of discursive and inter-subjective procedures, constructivists outline institutions as vital catalysts for political change, underline that actors construct their own reality and review ideas as the basis for the behavior (P. Haas and Haas 2002, 575). By emphasizing the social nature of integration (common values, norms, and standards), constructivists review CBC as a way of standardization of the cultural systems across borders (Checkel 2006, 2; Jańczak 2016, 66).

Unlike the above-discussed theoretical lenses, multi-level governance acknowledges CBC in different way. The multi-level governance recognizes the importance of central state in policy-making, but rejects its monopoly over the decision-making power. As an alternative, this theoretical perspective ascents on the power-sharing between multiple actors at European, national, subnational and local levels. Accordingly, in this perspective, states do not have authoritative "gatekeeper" capacity, and other subnational and local actors share greater importance in cross-border practices. The multi-level governance in relation to CBC will be discussed in depth in the next chapter 2 of this thesis.

1.2.4. Concluding Remarks

The simultaneous courses of globalization, regionalization and EU integration have accelerated collaboration across national borders, and turned CBRs into territorial-functional units. As a result, CBRs emerge as contact regions ('space of transition') that are often subject to diverse transformations (Perkmann 1999, 662; Dołzbłasz and Raczyk 2015, 360).

Recent research demonstrate that border-crossing generates a stimulus for economic growth, commercial activities, local facilities, SMEs, investments, institution-building, cultural tourism, education, and favorable democratic changes (Nagy and Turnock 2000, 255–71). The recommendations on success of CBC accentuate the critical importance of long-term objectives, involvement of multiple actors, durable funding scheme, binding concept of interests, common language (English), and structural arrangements.

Different theories review CBC in diverse ways: NF emphasizes on the "spill-over" sectoral effects CBC has, LI regards it as a privilege of states and constructivists consider it as an outcome of social context and common identities. Alternatively, MLG recognizes CBC as a result of multi-sectoral cooperation among actors at different territorial levels.

1.3. Critical Review/Thesis Contribution

The thesis largely contributes to border scholarship, MLG and CBC studies. The literature on border studies, CBC and MLG is diverse. This thesis trails the meaning and functions of borders and their unfixed nature in historical perspective. After the Second World War (WWII), European borders have become more enterable, strict regulations for border-crossing has been removed in the EU and cross-border activities steadily boosted. Current trends of globalization and regionalization have accelerated activities across borders and created the favorable environment for trans-national, trans-regional, and cross-border business. As a result, outstanding border scholars (Paasi 1998; Newman 2003; Rumford 2006; Cooper and Perkins 2012a; C. Johnson et al. 2011) conceptualize borders as continually contested, having the endless influence on daily life.

The literature on MLG is part of the wider debate on polycentric governance, governing of collective actions, the growing importance of sub-national and local actors, EU cohesion policy, the concept of territoriality, European integration, Europeanization, decentralization, 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' governance, borderlands literature, and spatial planning, etc. It evidently clarifies the distinctive features of MLG: first of all, it refers to governance (not government); secondly, it devotes to vertical power dispersal from nation states upwards to the supranational level and downwards to subnational and local levels, and horizontally towards state, non-state and private actors; thirdly, it understands decision-making through "complex overlapping networks"; fourthly, it focuses on new patterns of governance such as steering, networking, co-decision and co-ordination (Marks 1993, 1996; Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996; Marks and McAdam 1996; Ian Bache 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2001, 2002, 2003; Stubbs 2005; Nykvist 2008).

The study of CBC visibly shows that it must be embedded in multi-level relationships to be successful. The recent discussion on cross-border governance highlights the significance of para- and non-state institutions in the governance of cross-border space, scalar dimension of cross-border governance, territorial impact of globalization on the de-

territorialization of "nation scale" of government (state re-scaling) and the shifting of regulatory capacities to supra-national bodies and downward towards cross-border regions, transnational dense networks, cities, transboundary NGOs, etc (Kramsch and Mamadouh 2003, 41).

This is a matter of this thesis to make both theoretical and empirical inputs. First, it contributes to the conceptual clarity of MLG and uses it as well-fitted framework to study CBC. This thesis questions how MLG actually works in cross-border reality, how "loosely" or "strongly coupled" the relationships between different actors at multi-layers are organized. Second, it fills shortcoming of empirical research on functional cross-border interaction by reflecting the case of Estonian border regions. The findings of the thesis enable us to demonstrate the dynamics and differences (if applicable) of cross-border practices over the Schengen internal (Estonia-Latvia) and external (Estonia-Russia) borders in a comparative way. In brief, this thesis makes conceptual inputs and reduces empirical deficit.

Chapter II: Theoretical Framework – Concept of Multi-Level Governance

2.1. Early Inception of MLG and EC/EU Landmark Treaties

The early beginnings of MLG could be identified after the WWII, when states surrendered part of their sovereignties to international institutions in different policy sectors. The development of international regulations like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1947) is a good example of it. Moreover, the founders of the EEC attempted to become engaged in the net of interdependence. As a result, the Treaty of Rome introduced the supranational loyalties and benefits of economic cooperation. Since the 1960s, state power has been gradually transferred to sub-national governments and regional institutions. The financial and administrative decentralization of state-society relationships has been decisively driven by different factors such as democratic changes, expansion of public services, urbanization and agglomeration of cities, increase of local needs and etc.

Since the 1980s, the scope and competencies of EC/EU policies have been visibly extended that contested the superiority of the member states. This has shifted the architecture of European political order from the state-centric assumptions to the system of "multi-level governance" (MLG). Most obviously, the EC/EU major treaties have equipped the lowest level of governance with more capacities and accelerated the process towards multi-layered integration.

The Single European Act (SEA, 1986) was the first substantial provision to the Treaty of Rome, which expanded the scope and power of the Community while established the European area without internal frontiers (single market) (Petr Novak 2017a). Moreover, the SEA improved the decision-making capacity of the Council of Ministers by introducing qualified majority voting. The SEA also enhanced the role of the Parliament in the legislative process. Along with, it introduced the concept of 'European Security' and took steps forward to establish a European social area (CVCE 2017).

Later in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) has led to the establishment of the Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European citizenship, a single currency (Euros) and monetary policy, and overall closer integration (ECB 2017). The treaty provisions have modified the power structure of the Community and outlined a new framework for EU decision-making, with increased involvement of the EP, member states, and citizens. The Maastricht treaty has created a new co-decision procedure that significantly boosted the role of the European Parliament (EP) and equipped it with veto power. Hence, the EP and the Council work as equal players to overcome their dissimilar stands and reach out for common solutions under the Conciliation Committee. The treaty has introduced Union Citizenship and equipped citizens with rights to move and reside within the territory of member states, to participate in political life, to vote for local assemblies and EP, to stand for election in the member state of residence, to use the European Ombudsman and, appeal to the EP (Laitinen-Rawana 1994, 990; Wincott 1996, 409).

Moreover, the treaty has launched a principle of 'subsidiarity' – a division of power (power-sharing, decision-making at the lowest level) between the EU and member states. Article 3b clarifies: "In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only in and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community" (EC 1992, 13–14). Subsidiarity has become an instrument to "increase the flexibility and responsiveness of the entire union to local needs" (Laitinen-Rawana 1994, 988). In the Maastricht treaty, national governments agreed to create the Committee of the Regions (CoR), and the Council and the Commission are required to consult with it on regional and local matters. The CoR is also able to forward the relevant initiatives to the Commission and the Council. The EC member states had the inconsistent attitude towards the new treaty as it seemed to support power centralization on the EU-level;

"sovereignty and power flow from the nation states to the central institutions of the Community. The "bottom-up" power transfer depletes power at the national level" (Laitinen-Rawana 1994, 975). The Economic and Monetary provisions of the Treaty have also shifted the vital policy competencies from member states to the Union (Wincott 1996, 410).

Since 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam has changed the institutional balance of power between the Union members and the EP, extended the area of co-decision making, and recognized the Parliament's presence in home and judicial affairs. This treaty shifts from co-operation to co-decision and moves towards a multi-level polity (Andreas Maurer 2003, 231). The Treaty of Nice (2001) and its provisions have again enhanced the scope of co-decision, and made EU institutions more efficient and legitimate (Petr Novak 2017b, 1).

The White Paper 2001 on European Governance underlines the importance of regional and local authorities to ensure the principles (openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and cohesion) of good governance in the EU (COM 2001, 10). In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon strengthened mechanisms for multi-level governance and introduced three types of competence: exclusive competence (the EU legislates and adopts binding acts), shared competence (members can act only if EU has decided not to) and supporting competence (EU supports the implementation of the actions of the member states) (Novak and Raffaelli 2017, 2). Due to this competence-sharing scheme, territorial cohesion belongs to the "shared competence" between the EU and members (CoR 2009, 9; EUCOM 2018).

The White Paper on Multi-Level Governance (2009) underscores the advantage of MLG to explain the dynamics of vertical and horizontal integration in the EU and joint ownership within. The paper accentuates that "legitimacy, efficiency, and visibility of the way the Community operates depend on contributions from all the various players. They are guaranteed if local and regional authorities are genuine "partners" rather than mere "intermediaries" (CoR 2009, 11).

In a nutshell, the EC/EU treaties have created very distinctive features of EU new governance, which guarantees the indispensable partnership between multiple actors (national, regional, local, public, and private) on multi-layers of authority. It integrates several characteristics: first, the process of governing is no longer exclusive state responsibility; secondly, state-(non)state relationships have become "mutually-dependent", polycentric, and less hierarchical; third, governance is more focused on "problem-solving" (regulatory function) rather than bargaining style (redistribution function) (Hix 1998, 39). Accordingly, the policy-making process in the EU has become more complex that requires redistribution of regulatory power between multiple levels of territorial and functional entities.

Visibly, EU policies and subsequent reforms have shifted towards multi-level polity, institutional and decisional re-allocation up and down of state, and re-scaling of political authority (Marks 1993, 395; Stephenson 2013, 819; Hepburn 2016, 3). As a result, since the 1980s, inter-regional and cross-border associations, and pro-regional lobbies have flourished in the EU.

2.2. The Concept of Multi-Level Governance

The concept of multi-level governance is defined in a different way, but scholars commonly call for it to describe the process of vertical and horizontal diffusion of authority away from nation states (H. Schakel 2016, 98). The term MLG involves a "diverse set of arrangements, a panoply of systems of coordination and negotiation, among formally independent but functionally interdependent entities that stand in complex relations to one another and that, through coordination and negotiation, keep redefining the interrelations" (Piattoni 2009, 172). In other words, MLG is an analytical framework which well figures out the increased horizontal and vertical fragmentation and re-organization of state functions (Conzelmann 2008, 1; Roe 2009, 44).

The concept was initially proposed by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks in the early 1990s, as a useful tool to analyze the complex nature of decision-making process in the EU. Until then, the leading theories (neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), and Institutionalism) were used to explain how the EU functions, and the unit of analysis was either states with their national preferences or market forces (Piattoni 2009, 165). For instance, neofunctionalism[38] explains EU integration as a self-sustaining process, with functional (sectoral) spill-over from economics to other policy fields, leading to the creation of a supranational political center in Brussels (Moga 2009, 798; CIVITAS 2015, 1). The neo-functionalists criticize the "imagined predominance" of state in IR, stress for more integration through supranational institutions and argue that actors involved in the integration process are diverse, and their strategies are not identical. Since the early 1970s, neo-functionalism has failed to explain either external trends and shocks (oil crisis and economic downturn in 1974) or EU enlargement (French veto to UK membership in 1963/1967) (Schmitter 1996, 13–14).

The counter reasonable arguments to neo-functionalism were developed by state-centrism Intergovernmentalists. Intergovernmentalism explains European integration as a zero-sum game where the winner takes all and national interests are at the top. The theory argues that state controls the European integration process without surrendering its sovereignty, and European cooperation is more "pooling and sharing of sovereignty, as opposed to a transfer of sovereignty from the national to the supranational level" (Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2016, 89). Later, this theoretical approach was reinforced by Moravcsik's theory of liberal intergovernmentalism (LI). LI theory argues that national governments aggregate the preferences of domestic constituencies towards European integration and represent them at the intergovernmental bargaining table in Brussels, whereas supranational organizations (for instance, the European Commission) have no causal impact (Pollack 2001, 225; CIVITAS 2015, 1). LI is based on three key assumptions

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[38] Ernst Haas is a leading neo-functionalist scholar, his famous book is entitled, "The Uniting of Europe".

(Piattoni 2009, 166): 1. states are unitary actors to decide the existence of sub-national formations and their representation in EU politics (center-periphery gates), 2. States have authority to select which social groups transmit collective interests (state-society gates), 3. States have a legitimacy to represent domestic interests (domestic-foreign gates). LI emphasizes the importance of relative power, the autonomy of national leaders, and accords supranational institutions and officials less weight and standing (Moravcsik 1993, 518–19).

In the 1980s-1990s, new Institutionalism underlined the importance of institutions for the EU integration process. Hall and Taylor (1996) identified three schools of thought on institutionalization (Hall and Taylor 1996; Alexander 2005): Historical Institutionalists consider institutional organization of the polity as the principal factor structuring collective behavior and generating distinctive outcome; Rational Choice Institutionalism underlines the role of strategic interaction and presumes that actors create institutions to gain from cooperation; Sociological Institutionalists consider institutions as symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that frame human actions.

However, these leading theoretical models haven't provided the proper explanation of the multi-level and scalar dimension of the European integration. Moreover, they don't reveal the process of daily policy-making in the EU (Scharpf 2000, 26; H. Schakel 2016, 99). The traditional conceptualizations of EU decision-making are missing the "crucial element in the whole picture, namely, the increasing importance of subnational levels of decision-making and their myriad connections with other levels" (Ian Bache 1998, 143). Instead, MLG has emerged as the only model where region is a level of significance along with European, national and local layers (Börzel 1997, 10).

MLG does not exclude the role of states, but emphasizes that they do not act in isolation and are no longer a superior driver of social and political life. State power and control is displaced upwards (international actors/organizations), downwards (regions, cities and communities), and outwards (institutions operating under discretion from the state)

(Pierre and Peters 2000, 75–93; Hooghe and Marks 2001, 77). The functions are evidently scattered from central government to sub-national and local ones ("Shadow of Hierarchy") (Guy Peters 2011, 2). In MLG, there is no single center of accumulated power, but supranational, national, subnational and local authorities are all engaged into collaboration.

MLG explains modern governance in the EU as circulation across multiple actors and layers. This new governance empowers regions, makes frontiers more porous and creates new settings for intergovernmental relations (Bourne 2003, 600). The scattering of governance across multiple jurisdictions is useful and "more flexible than the concentration of governance in one jurisdiction", because centralized governance does not provide scale efficiency (Hooghe 1995, 176; Hooghe and Marks 2003, 235). Additionally, for better explanation, in the state-centric model, there is very little space for direct subnational mobilization and contacts among member states, subnational and supranational actors are scare, hierarchical and peripheral (Hooghe 1995, 177). Accordingly, in this case, the policy outcome evidently reveals "interests and relative power of Member State executives" (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996, 342).

On the contrary, MLG gives emphasis to policy drafting with involvement of many actors (including the state among others) at multi-levels of interaction. In the EU context, it means that policy competencies are delegated in favor of supranational and subnational actors and the decision-making process is no longer monopolized by state executives (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996, 346). Through this model, subnational actors are not under domination of the state, but act independently to establish transnational links and trans-regional associations, and have a direct access to the Union arena (Hooghe 1995, 178; Hooghe and Marks 1996, 73; Hooghe and Marks 2001, 78; Boman 2005a, 9). Hence, the non-central state and non-state actors freely participate in the formation of EU politics, without 'state permission' (Piattoni 2009, 166).

MLG holds up multi-level game instead of a two-level and underlines that sub-national and local level (interests groups and sub-national governments) decisively matter for the overall functioning of the EU. It creates less hierarchical networks of interdependence and partnerships where different types of political games (interaction, bargaining, participation, etc.) are exercised among state, sub-state and non-state actors (Nousiainen and Mäkinen 2015, 208).

MLG supports subsidiarity, which implies autonomy for lower-level units to implement the policy of their relevance (Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin 2008, 273). This new type of governance enlarges the "territorial scope for political actions 'beyond the nation-state'" and engages member states into "complex transnational and multi-level system of decision-making" (Knodt 2004, 703). Multi-level policy-making incorporates the following features (Benz and Eberlein 1999, 335): a) it's an integrative approach to coordinate different structural funds; b) it improves vertical intergovernmental coordination and partnership; c) it creates a system of joint finance connecting budgetary policies of different levels of government; d) it mobilizes public and private actors to increase development potential.

The European multi-level governance creates a new institutional structuring, incorporates supranational institutions, member states, subnational/regional, local, public, and private actors. The multi-level polity of European integration has created five extra-national channels for sub-national representation in the EU[39]: the Committee of the Regions, the Council of Ministers, the Commission, regional offices and transnational associations (Hooghe and Marks 1996, 74). President of the Committee of the Regions Luc Van den Brande proclaims that "multi-level governance is not a utopia or just a concept: it is a method and a solution for installing a more innovative, flexible, and inclusive approach likely to reconcile the people's Europe and EU management of the overall challenges" (CoR 2009, 4). The results of the Special Eurobarometer 307 demonstrates that EU citizens consider the

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[39] It's worth mentioning that not all regional (third level/meso level) units are able to activate their demands at the EU level; wealthier regions seem more advantageous to impact EU policy channels rather than poorer ones.

regional and local level as a vital element of EU legitimacy and the level of trust in the local and regional authorities is higher (50%) rather than in national governments (34%) or the EU (47%) (CoR 2008, 27).

In respect to MLG, the future of state is frequently discussed. Some scholars indicate the final decline of the state, while others talk about the adaptation of a state to new external reality. For instance, Peters and Pierre (2000) argue that intergovernmental relationships still "carry some weight", but has become more negotiated and contextual all together (Pierre and Peters 2000, 92). This thesis is in favour to the opinion of scholars who argue that the state is not in decline, but is transformed through European governance from zero-sum logic of politics towards positive-sum resource allocation (Börzel 1997, 10; Hix 1998, 40).

Regardless the advantages of MLG discussed-above, MLG still often regarded as a fuzzy concept. Knodt (2004) argues that MLG is a portrayal of the EU itself rather than theory, which overvalues the role of sub-national actors and disregards international level of integration(Knodt 2004, 701). Some scholars highlight the "functional overreach"[40] of CoR, characterize sub-national units as passive players, fully depended on the interplay among the state and EU (Hepburn 2016, 5–6).

2.3. Multi-Level Governance Type I & Type II

MLG I and II have many distinctive virtues, but they have a common feature as diffusing power from central authority up, down and beyond. They are logically complementary, but present two alternatives of rule making, implementing and adjudicating. Marks and Hooghe distinguish two types of MLG (Marks 1993; Hooghe 1995; Hooghe and Marks 1996, 2001, 2002, 2003; Conzelmann 2008; Piattoni 2009; Bache 2010; Entwistle et al. 2014):

Type I describes system-wide governing arrangements where diffusion of authority is restricted to a limited number of non-intersecting jurisdictions at a limited number of

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[40] Expressing position in relation to many issues without any real impact.

territorial levels. Together they deal with many responsibilities, but the membership boundaries do not intersect and it "extends the Westphalian principle of exclusivity into the domestic area". This type has "competency constraint" as governmental organizations are not flexible enough to solve policy issues. The intellectual foundation of this type is Federalism, which demonstrates relationships between national, tiers of non-intersecting, sub-national, and international jurisdictions. Every citizen is locked in a "Russian doll set of nested jurisdictions where there is one and only one relevant jurisdiction at any particular territorial scale". Territorial jurisdiction is stable for decades, and jurisdictional reforms are normally "costly and unusual". The unit of analysis is individual government rather than specific policy. The framework is "system-wide… Levels of government are multiple but limited in number". This type is recognized as a 'layer cake', which suggests that "there is little need for intergovernmental coordination" and each layer enjoys its own autonomy, without interest in each others' competencies.

Type II is linked to the flexible, functionally fragmented and task-specific ("specific-purpose") jurisdiction, policy effectiveness and elimination of negative-effects of externalities. Frey & Eichenberger (1999) abbreviated this type of governance as FOCJ - functional, overlapping, and competing jurisdictions. Stephenson explains it as a "layered system of co-existing levels of authority - a complex pattern of transnational, public, and private institutional relations with overlapping competencies" (Stephenson 2013, 821). There are multiple jurisdictions with distinct functions and public services are provided by a particular jurisdiction, after the effective cost-benefit calculations. This type enables to comparatively analyze "decision-making and implementation networks across different policy fields" and institutional settings. The scholars often compare this model to marble cake. This type is often deployed in the frontier regions of Western Europe and incorporates school and university cooperation, joint research programs, teacher exchanges, meetings among mayors, regional planners, local associations, associations, local chambers, etc. Type II co-exists with Type I in a "negotiated order". The intellectual foundation of this Type lies in

federalism, but also "accommodates relationships between all levels of jurisdiction, including bi- and multi-lateral, involving cross-jurisdictionally defined institutions as well" (Roe 2009, 45).

Type I (Layer Cake)	Type II (Marble Cake)
1. 'General Purpose' Jurisdictions;	1. 'Task-Specific' Jurisdictions;
2. Non-intersecting Memberships;	2. Intersecting Memberships;
3. Jurisdictions at a limited number of levels;	3. No limit to the quantity of jurisdictional levels;
4. System-wide architecture;	4. Flexible Design;
5. Encompassing territorial communities;	5. Constituencies are individuals sharing some geographical and functional space;
6. Intrinsic;	6. Extrinsic;
7. Non-intersecting from the standpoint of membership;	7. Non-intersecting from the standpoint of tasks;
8. Stable;	8. Fluctuating;

Note: summary from the works of Hooghe (1995, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2003), Marks (1993, 1996), Piatonni(2009), Conzelmann (1997, 2008), Entwistle et al (2014), Stephenson (2013), Frey & Eichenberger (1999), Roe(2009)

2.4. Multi-Level (Territorial) Governance and Cross-Border Governance

The concept of territoriality regards territory a key determinant of political actions, and clarifies that "political control and legitimacy are linked to the clearly defined physical areas of nation states", and national borders have double-edge significance that contours different jurisdictions (Chilla, Evrard, and Schulz 2012, 962). Moreover, territoriality is a geographical expression of power, "asserting control over a geographical area" (including border area) (Harvey 1997, 13). It's a "spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control resources and people" (Anderson and O'Dowd 1999, 598; Hepburn 2007, 1). Territoriality is about the authority of territorially-bounded borders.

Nowadays, spatial planning and development strategies have challenged the traditional concept of territoriality and hence, territory has become more relational carrying different functions. The cross-border economic and political activities, involvements of

transnational, trans-regional and local actors, social and cultural changes have challenged state territoriality (the supreme role of the state within its territory). As Paasi remarks "territories increasingly 'leak' and 'stretch' in space across borders" (Luukkonen and Moilanen 2012, 485). Blatter explains that "there is a shift away from a territorial to a purely functional organization, acting without a clear territorial focus, mandate or linear limitations" (Chilla, Evrard, and Schulz 2012, 963). In brief, the territoriality should be understood in respect to supra-state and sub-state regions, geopolitical changes and growth of transnationalism, and the reality of overlapping/multiple jurisdictions (Anderson and O'Dowd 1999, 602). Schön (2005) clarifies the key distinction between territorial and spatial policies as follows: "While territorial policies focus on the development of particular territories, spatial development policy involves different spatial levels, from European to local, to a process which aims at better cooperation and coordination of spatial relationships" (Luukkonen and Moilanen 2012, 486).

In the present-day EU, European integration has formed a new framework for territorial strategies and brought spatial planning into the agenda. It has promoted certain spatial discourses such as – polycentrism, soft planning, and CBC (Luukkonen and Moilanen 2012, 483). CBC embraces both coordinated vertical policy networks and horizontal cooperative relationships among multiple state and non-state actors (municipalities, city councils, universities, schools, NGOs, associations and etc.) (J. Jauhiainen 2002, 157). Supranational, national, and sub-national (regional/local) interests are all presented in the CBC activities.

MLG is primarily territorial. It establishes a space below and above the nation-state, and power is being diffused across multiple territorial levels (Keating, Hooghe, and Tatham 2015, 446). MLG connects territorial levels (supranational, national, and subnational) and in a more general sense, jurisdictional levels. Faludi (2012) remarks that "multi-level and geographically flexible territorial governance should be able to manage different functional

territories and ensure the balanced and coordinated contribution of local, regional, and European actors – such as authorities or governments – in compliance with the principle of subsidiary through systematic integration of territorial aspects" (Faludi 2012, 197).

Accordingly, MLG is a well-fit framework for CBC, because it stresses the importance of "third level of governance", does not imply a single objective and certainly requires "complex governance mechanisms including subnational, national, and supranational actors" (Boman 2005a, 10). As discussed in the Chapter 1, the successful CBC needs multilateral coordination and involvement of multiple actors (state, non-state, and private) from different territorial scales.

MLG provides the framework to "accommodate supranational, national, regional and local governments …enmeshed in territorially overarching policy network" (Roe 2009, 44). In the EU, cross-border collaboration has been producing soft, but "formalized, comprehensive and territorially defined layers in the European 'multi-level-system'" (J. K. Blatter 2001b, 175). MLG supports active involvement of various stakeholders to elaborate more effective multi-negotiated cross-border policies. For instance, EGTC is a such policy, which creates framework for efficient collaboration and multilevel planning (Edit Soos 2017, 4). Supranational, national, regional and local authorities have different responsibilities in CBC. In the ideal CBC planning, a supranational authority (the EU) explicitly contributes to eliminate the peripheriality and underdevelopment of cross-border areas, national authorities create cooperative bi-lateral governance structures and regional/local level aggregates the local needs of cross-border communities for active common actions.

2.5. EU Policies with Multi-Level Territorial and Spatial Impacts

The EU policies are designed to ensure territorial integration at different levels and geographical scales, which implies elimination of the negative effects of the administrative borders and creation of mutually-dependent functional areas (for instance, objectives of the

INTERREG programmes). Such approach enables European citizens to perceive the benefits of territorial diversity.

The notion of territorial cohesion was first initiated in 1989 at the informal meeting of ministers responsible for territorial planning. Since then, the European Commission adopted the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP, 1999), INTERREG, Europe 2000, Europe 2000+, the Lisbon Treaty (2007), White Paper on European Governance (2001), ESPON 2006, Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion (2007), White Paper on Multi-level Governance (2009), VASAB 2010, Barca Report (2014-2020), 5th Cohesion Report, etc. (Böhme et al. 2011, 14–16). These documents have paved the way to the territorial policies of the EU. For instance, the Lisbon Treaty (Article 2 and Article 3) clarifies: "[the Union] shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity among Member States" and emphasizes the "shared competence between the Union and the member states applies in (…) economic, social and territorial cohesion" (EUR-Lex 2007). Europe 2020 has three reinforcing priorities: smart growth (knowledge and innovation-based economy development), sustainable growth (promotion of greener and competitive economy) and inclusive growth (social and territorial cohesion). Territorial Agenda (TA) 2020 is an action-oriented framework for spatial planning and territorial development in Europe which implies the following priorities (Böhme et al. 2011, 13): polycentric and balanced territorial development; integrated development in cities, rural and specific regions; territorial integration in cross-border and transnational functional regions; well-built local economies of regions to be strong towards external shocks; territorial connectivity of individuals, enterprises and communities; connecting cultural, ecological and landscape values of regions. All these priorities require a broad range of actions at the EU, national, regional, and local levels to achieve them (COM 2010).

Moreover, there are European policies with direct impact on spatial development such as Community Competition Policy, Trans-European Networks (TEN), Structural Funds,

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Environment Policy, Research, Technology and Development (RTD), etc. For instance, European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDF) clarifies that (COM 1999, 13–18):

- The Competition Policy favors better location conditions;
- TEN networks of transport, telecommunication and energy;
- The Structural Funds contribute to integration through a programme-based system of cooperation;
- CAP donates to the development of social and economic conditions in rural areas;
- Environmental policy holds location factors;
- RTD requires multi-lateral framework and involvement of different actors;

In the real context of the EU, much research is dedicated to the critical importance of vertical and horizontal coordination and integration of 'territorially-relevant' policies and those which are 'non-territorially focused', but truly influential (Böhme et al. 2011, 23). This necessity of policy convergence and sectoral synergies logically lead to multi-level governance, where "the responsibility for policy design and implementation is distributed between different levels of government and special-purpose local institutions" (ibid. p. 25). The synergies and coherence of sectoral and territorial policies contribute to the prevention of the possible conflicts (COM 2008, 9).

Future EU integration lays in specific strands of territorial cooperation, which incorporate micro, meso, and macro strategies (EUREG 2009, 3):

- CBC – cooperation across neighboring regions separated by national borders;
- Transnational cooperation - covers larger areas such as the Baltic Sea, Danube, Alpine, and Mediterranean regions;
- Interregional cooperation – cooperation between non-neighboring regional and local bodies;

- CBC at external borders – joint and coordinated programming at both sides of borders;

In order for these types of cooperation to function well, there is a need for horizontal and vertical coordination, alignment of local, regional, national, and European strategies, coordinated regulations and multi-level planning (ibid. p. 22).

2.6. Concluding Remarks

MLG has become a central concept to explain day-to-day policy-making in the EU. The globalization of capital markets, adoption of the Community treaties, European integration and complementary adjustments have constructed European multi-level polity (Scharpf 1994, 3). The emergence of MLG has changed traditional understanding of state sovereignty and manifested impacts of sub-national, transnational and trans-regional institutions vis-à-vis state. It's a functional alternative to the traditional top-down (state-centered) approach. Unlike traditional and hierarchical models of government, MLG leads to more negotiated, vertical 'layering' and non-hierarchical relationships at supranational, transnational, regional and local levels (Guy Peters and Pierre 2001, 131).

MLG "describes authority relations that are unstable, contested, territorially heterogeneous, and non-hierarchical, rather than stable, consensual, territorially uniform, and hierarchical" (Hooghe and Marks 1996, 91). Under this concept, states share rather than monopolize or control politics within their territories across multiple policy areas (Conzelmann 1997, 8; Keating, Hooghe, and Tatham 2015, 450).

To sum up the distinctive features of MLG types (Entwistle et al. 2014, 312–14): the MLG layer cake-type is an arrangement where each level of government has "local sovereignty" and authority to make final decisions within its territorial scale; and increase of power at one governmental layer "requires a co-relative decline at another" (zero-sum relationships). The MLG marble cake-type oversees governance not in the authoritative

decisions of governments, but in the daily overlapping and interlaced activities of governmental and non-governmental organizations.

The EU programmes inspire multi-level partnership which channels sub-national and non-state actors in the national decision-making process (Marks and McAdam 1996, 119; Sbragia 2002, 13). There are clear overlapping links between the concepts of cross-border governance and MLG. CBRs are a cornerstone of EU cohesion policy, which itself is a primary root of MLG. The cross-border regionalization and re-scaling of territorial governance create patterns of multi-level polity which enables construction of competitive and co-operative local spaces (Gualini 2003, 46). Multi-level governance is at heart to establish and manage CBC programmes and other types of decentralized partnerships in cross-border areas.

Chapter III: Case Study: Eastern and Southern Border Regions of Estonia; Historical Background and Current Situation

3.1. Never-Ending Negotiations on Estonia's Eastern Border with Russia

The Estonian-Russian border is about 338 km and approx. 2/3 of it runs through the biggest transboundary lake Peipsi/Chudskoe and the Narva River (See annex 6). The Estonian-Russian borderland incorporates the following border regions: on the Estonian side, there are Idaa-Virumaa, Põlvamaa and Võrumaa, and the Russian side includes Kingisepp, Slantsy (Leningrad Oblast), Gdov, Pskov, Pechory District (Pskov Oblast). The Idaa-Virumaa region[41] is regarded as a "Russian-speaking state within a state" (Tomáš Havlíček, Milan Jeřábek, and Jaroslav Dokoupil 2017, 159).

The borderland between Estonia and Russia is usually observed as a contested area, a geopolitically sensitive battlefield. The border is often regarded as a line of identification for two civilizations, or an artificial frontier across the homogenous cultural area or a front-line of stability and etc. (Tüür and Denis Norkin 2001, 51). It has explicitly experienced a vivid change from being an internal border of the Soviet Union towards the international between two independent states and then, EU external frontier (Pfoser 2014, 271).

The negotiations over the border treaty among Estonia and Russia started in the early 1990s. In 1994, Yeltsin signed the Order and unilaterally marked the Estonia-Russia border as it was demarcated in 1991 (24 August), on the day of Estonia's independence (Liik 2005). Such strategic behavior of Russia hardened the process of negotiation for Estonians over the legal aspects (validity of the Tartu Treaty 1920) and physical location of the border (ibid.). The respective Estonian delegation was formed in 1996 to settle with the Russian side. The process of negotiations was the longest in Estonian diplomacy and very stressful; it seemed

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[41] Narva, a border city of our research, is located in Ida-Viruma region.

that the parties reached the agreement, but the next morning the Russian position had changed and the cycle started all over again (ibid.).

On May 18, 2005, Estonia's Foreign Minister Urmas Paet and Russian Minister Sergey Lavrov signed the treaty on the land and maritime borders between Estonia and Russia. The Estonian Parliament ratified the treaty[42] in the period of a month. The Estonian law of ratification included the introductory declaration/preamble citing the Tartu Peace Treaty 1920. This behavior was accepted by Russia as a basis for future territorial claims (land or compensation) and Moscow withdrew its signature (Reuters 2014). Estonia immediately denied having any further territorial claims on Russia. The Russian side declared that it would not sign the treaty until the sensitive political issues between the two states would be decided in an acceptable manner (Mälksoo 2005, 513).

The negotiations were re-opened in 2012-2013. And, finally on February 18, 2014 the foreign ministers of both states signed a set of border treaties in Moscow (ERR 2019). In the fall of 2015, Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Marina Kaljurand and her Russian Counterpart Sergey Lavrov agreed to send the treaty to the Parliaments for ratification. The Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu) passed the first reading of the treaty on November 25, 2015. As the Riigikogu Press Service clarifies, the bill on the ratification of the border treaty must be in the legislative proceedings until the termination of the Riigikogu mandate in 2019, otherwise the bill will be dropped out from the proceedings (Riigikogu 2016). The Russian side hasn't even started the process of ratification. In 2016, Russian Ambassador to Estonia Alexander Petrov commented that the ratification process had been delayed due to unfavorable bi-lateral relations (ERR 2017a). These relationships were particularly deteriorated when the Pskov delegation travelling to celebrate Soviet Victory Day (May 9 in Tartu) was stopped on the border for hours and then sent back to the Russian territory because of visa concerns.

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[42] On June 2005, 78 in favor and 4 against.

To the question by an Estonian journalist as to when the border treaty will be finally moved forward, Speaker of the Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko answered: "This question should be addressed to the Estonian side, not the Russian side; we have done everything necessary to regulate this topic. We hope that our Estonian partners will go through their road toward signing this agreement" (ERR 2017b). As a response, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee Marko Mihkelson clarifies that the border treaty is already signed and the Estonian side has taken further steps towards ratification, but "the final ratification of the treaties can only take place when the Russian parliament is also ready for that and the Russian side knows this perfectly well, Estonia is completely blameless in this" (Riigikogu 2017).

In 2018, Estonia is still waiting for Russia to ratify the border treaty. The bilateral relation between two states remains tense. The Russian Embassy in Tallinn declares that Russian side won't move forward till the Estonian leadership doesn't stop its Russophobic activities. In May, Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid expressed her readiness to visit and thank Russia if they would sign the treaty. In return, the Russian embassy again emphasized the anti-Russian sentiments of Estonia and declared that under such condition, ratifying of the border treaty was questionable (EADaily 2018).

3.1.1. Historical Overview of Estonia-Russia Border

Narva is a border industrial town in the north-east Estonia, with 95% of Russian-speaking population. At various times, Narva and its neighboring Ivangorod (now, Russia) were together ruled by Danish, Livonian, Swedish and Russian authorities. Since the mid-sixteen century, the border towns belonged to the same state and formed an integrated settlement, where small Ivangorod was a suburb of larger Narva (Pfoser 2017, 29). The 19th century was the period of modernization for Narva-Ivangorod, when textile factories (for instance, Kreenholm in 1857) were opened (J. S. Jauhiainen and Pikner 2009, 7). After the Estonian independence in 1920, Narva and Ivangorod remained united, as the Tartu Peace

treaty marked off the border to the east of Narva River and left the Narva suburb of Ivangorod/Jaanilinn in Estonia (Lundén 2009, 140).

During WWII, Narva became a frontline, 98% of the buildings were totally destroyed and others became damaged by the Soviet troops (J. S. Jauhiainen and Pikner 2009, 8). In 1944, Estonia was occupied by the Soviet Union and Stalin demarcated the Narva River as a dividing line[43]. The town was later re-built and re-settled by the Slavic labors from the Soviet Union. Then, the separate administrative divisions of the Russian and Estonian Socialist Soviet Republics were established. However, the administrative border had not affected the cooperation within the integrated settlement of Narva and Ivangorod. They continued to develop a single functional entity, with common living space (labor contacts, water draining, sewage system transport networking, labor contacts and kinship ties) (Berg 2001b, 109). For instance, the enterprises from one side of the Narva River built the dwellings for their employees on the other side of the administrative border (Brednikova and Siim 2001, 19). The republic boundaries only turned to become significant in some cases - when people returned from the labor camps were not allowed to settle in the former place of their residence (Lundén 2002, 178). It's worth mentioning that living in Estonian Narva was considered more prestigious and the Russian-speaking population from Russia and other Soviet republics moved to the Soviet industrial hub. This led to the widespread use of Russian language in Narva and other parts of the Ida-Virumaa province. Up until now, Russian language is the first language of instruction at schools in Narva. Some schools teach in Estonian, but there is a local shortage of Estonian language teachers. The local inhabitants are users of Russian media outlets, and local broadcasts are also delivered in Russian.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Estonia's border with Russia follows the channel of Narva River as it was defined in 1944, while de jure border is still in the outskirts of Narva-Ivangorod like it's defined by the Tartu Border Agreement 1920 (J. Jauhiainen 2002,

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[43] As a result, Estonia lost approx. 2000 sq. kilometers of land.

170). Since then, the integrated settlement of Narva-Ivangorod has become spatially and socially transformed and the Russian-speaking population started to re-arrange their transborder everyday life. The re-organization of the shared services with Ivangorod started soon: public transportation was cut-off in 1992, telephone service in 1994, and heating was stopped in 1996 (Lundén 2009, 144). Regarding the water, the distribution point was located on the Estonian side and Narva Vesi continued to supply Ivangorod as a foreign customer. In 1996-97, with EU financial support, Narva residents installed water consumption meters that brought a decrease in actual water consumption and incomes of Narva Vesi (J. S. Jauhiainen and Pikner 2009, 12). Therefore, the company introduced increased-price politics. Due to unpaid debts (over EUR 1.2 million), Narva Vesi closed the water delivery to Ivangorod in 1999 (Lundén 2002, 185; J. S. Jauhiainen and Pikner 2009, 13).

In 1991, the simplified cross-border regime was drafted for the population of Narva-Ivangorod and southeast Estonia. This regime was valid until the end of 1992. Later, the Estonian government decided not to prolong the simplified crossings. However, municipal authorities and border guards continued to issue border-crossing passes for locals to work and study across the border, and to visit relatives or churches until 2000 (Berg and Ehin 2004, 229; Berg, Boman, and Kolossov 2005, 13). Because the crossing procedures were mostly implemented by the local governments, there were significant regional differences in the border-crossing regulations: on the north-east border, the simplified procedures were designed for the inhabitants who had kinship ties or real estate or land on the other side of the border; and, on the south-east border, local Seto[44] people could refer to the simplified crossing on Orthodox religious holidays (Berg and Ehin 2004, 239). The EU largely criticized the simplified border regime and marked its unfitness with the acquis standards (ibid. p. 245). In 2000, the simplified border regime was finally abolished, local crossing check-points

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[44] Ethnic minority; there are only 230 native Setos on the Russian side, while 3000 live in their Estonian homeland Setomaa (10-13 000 in Estonia); the biggest concentration could be found in Tallinn and Tartu where they always try to lobby governmental programs (Raagmaa and Säre 2014, 11–12).

(Meremäe, Lüübnitsa, Võmmorski, Kulje) were closed and 4,000 multiple entry visas a year were issued. The local inhabitants could apply for a visa and the respective regional centers/visa coordinators were located in the towns of Narva (North-East) and Võru (South-East) (ibid. p. 245). Field research conducted by Berg and Ehin (in 2004) reveals that all major groups (business people, local authorities, community leaders and activists) evaluate the establishment of a border regime in a positive way; and, the number of free visas were absolutely adequate (ibid. p. 248). The newly-established border regime regulated their inter-communal relations with their neighbours having the same ethno-cultural background (Berg 2001b, 109). The field researchers (Brednikova & Siim (2001), Berg (2001)) argue that the new border reality has simultaneously triggered the differentiation/separation and integration/contact across the border. On one hand, it limited the family and cultural ties. Alternatively, the border emerged as a solid source for joint transnational business/trade activities and economic solidarity. As the scholars note, the concurrent process of separation and integration has made Narva and Ivangorod, not divided, but twin-towns with common border-zone space. So, the Narva-Ivangorod case shows that the border could be both a burden and a resource, an outer limit of the citizenry and state nationalism, or a transit zone for daily trade activities (Berg 2000, 95).

Following the break-down of the Soviet rule, Estonian cultural elites and historians tried to Estonianize Narva, but the local population was more Moscow-directed than westwards towards Tallinn (Pfoser 2014, 273). The people of Narva faced nationalizing policies. The citizenry policy for Russian speaking population has become a big challenge for the Estonian state. Initially, this policy was based on the pre-Soviet policy (Citizenship Law 1938), which was largely focused on ethnic Estonians, and prioritized the principles of jus sanguinis (blood i.e. heritage or ethnicity) over jus soli (soil, place of birth) to acquire citizenship (David J. Trimbach 2017). Later in 1995, the updated Citizenship Act (Kodakondsuse seadus) and following legislation stated that Estonian citizenship could be obtained at birth (through jus sanguinis) by naturalization or re-acquired by individuals who

lost it, with particular stress on the Estonian language test (written/oral), eight years of legal residency (incl. five year permanent), consistent legal income, and an Estonian constitution competency exam (ibid.). Nevertheless, Estonian citizenship policy has become more comprehensive, it still predominantly affects the Russian-speakers (ethnic Russians) in Estonia. Because of this policy, they became stateless with gray Alien's Passport, with the possibility to acquire Estonian citizenship, Russian citizenship (or other citizenship), or stay stateless. Many of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia prefer to avoid the Estonian arduous naturalization process in favor of Russian citizenship or stateless residency. Through such preference, they are able to travel visa-free across the EU (unlike Russians) and also in Russia (unlike Estonians). The Estonian citizenry policy and status of the Russian-speaking population directly influence not only their political or electoral engagement, but the management of the external border among Estonia and Russia. In 2000-2001, the EC stated that Estonia met the OSCE recommendations on naturalization and citizenship and the Citizenship Law was in compliance with international standards (Feldman 2005, 688). Recently, according to the data 2012-2017 of Statistics Estonia, Ida-Virumaa County has experienced overall population decline, but ethnic Russians are four times more than ethnic Estonians (105 177 ethnic Russians/27161 ethnic Estonians).

3.2. Lake Peipsi Border Area

The very middle border-line among Estonia and Russia goes along Lake Peipsi, a physical-natural feature of the landscape. The western coast of Peipsi Lake is multicultural in terms of ethnic (Russians/Estonians) and religion composition (Orthodox, Lutherans, Old Believers, and Baptists). The locals have unique cultures and location-defined peculiarities. For instance: Jaama is a distinct Russian village, Mehikoorma is almost entirely Estonian. The ethnic Russians, inhabited in this cross-border region, do not have much interest in common with people on the Russian side of the border. The connection between the neighboring larger settlements Mustvee and Gdov is considerably weak, even though there are not

border-crossing points, and mental and physical barriers separate people (Berg 2001b, 113). The narrative shows that people who reside on the Estonian side of the border felt secure and they were not very enthusiastic to cultural exchanges with Gdov because of money/time issues (Tatyana Maximova 2001, 42). The new border regime has not influenced much on the daily life of locals[45], because they did not experience very intensive social/economic connections during the Soviet times. Moreover, the identity of the locals is related to their land rather than to their ethnicity. Accordingly, the cultural and lifestyle difference between the local Russians across the border-line is visible. The same attitudes appear in Mehikoorma and the island of Piirissare where communities had close ties with the neighboring villages of Russia (Pnevo, Putkovo, Samolva), but now they are making a clear distinction between them and their neighbours on the Russian side of the lake. Estonian locals only complain for losing access to the Russian market, where they were selling vegetables and also, fish stocks remained mostly on the Russian side of the border (Nikiforova 1999, 34; Tüür and Denis Norkin 2001, 60). The general outlook of the local Estonians is positive towards Russians, but they do not have any intensive emotional feelings to visit Russian villages.

In the very southern part of the Estonian-Russian border, Setomaa is a special case. Unlike Estonians, Setos are Orthodox, but the language is a dialect of Estonian. The behaviour of the Estonian government could be described as a colonizer, they established Estonian schools and settlements in Setomaa; and, Estonians, Setos, and Russians created Setomaa before WWII (Raagmaa and Säre 2014, 7). In the 1990s, the self-identification movement of the Seto people became stronger, with demands for an "Independent Seto Kingdom". The establishment of the border also changed the local economy and people tried to get used to the limitations of the new social space (Nikiforova and Jevgenia Viktorova 2001, 83).

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[45] Only the fishery sector, Russian and Estonian boats get fines for crossing the border, mostly unintentionally.

3.3. Southern Border Area

In the Soviet era, Valga and Valka was a single unit with common health-care services and infrastructure. But, after the independence in the 1990s, both towns have constructed their own supply systems (water sewage plant, for example). After WWII, under the Soviet rule, Valga and Valka became parts of two different states, but continued functioning as a single Soviet town. Many Valga Estonians on their return from Siberia[46] settled on Savienîba Street in Latvia because they were not allowed to settle in their original quarters. Until the Schengen agreement between Latvia and Estonia, the people in Savienîba had much inconveniency to cross the border. In 2001, only nine families lived in Savienîba (26 were Estonian citizens, 7 Latvian citizens and 2 non-citizens). People who got Latvian citizenship, had preferences to get easier life, but still marked themselves as Estonians by nationality (Lundén 2009, 147). The Savienîba population had many problems related to land ownership, electricity supply, infrastructure, telephone system, and healthcare. For instance, the Estonian side was providing the electricity for them with cheaper prices than in Latvia, and Latvian authorities wanted to supply locals. Moreover, the Latvian law states that foreigners are not able to own land within 2 km along the Latvian border, which automatically means that Estonians on Savienîba Street do not have any private property rights. And, if some of them managed, they wished to sell the property and move to Valga, but Latvians were not willing to buy property at the very periphery of Latvia. In the education sector, the Russian-language schools of Valka and Valga are becoming more integrated with the national schools on each side, while Estonian and Latvian language schools do not have close contacts across the border (Lundén 2009, 148). The membership of Estonia and Latvia to the EU in 2004 and the Schengen zone in 2007 automatically diminished many border-related problems. The statistical data of 2017 (provided by Statistics Estonia) on the nationality in Valga County shows: totally, 30 084 people live in the county

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[46] They were exiled to Siberia.

and the majority of the population are Estonians (around 82% Estonians (24 559)), while less than 1 percent are Latvians (444) and around 10% are Russians (3672).

The rationale behind the border-crossing between Valga and Valka lies in shopping. The product price is lower in Valga[47] and Valka population crosses the border more frequently (Lundén 2002, 193). Also, Lundén remarks that border-crossing here is related to educational and religious purposes; some Russian-speaking pupils cross the border from Valga to Valka because their school in Valka is closer to some parts of Valga municipality; the Russian Orthodox and Catholic Church are located in Valga, while the cemetery is in Valka. The barrier to the relations between the two different ethnic groups (Estonians and Latvians) is language. Estonians and Latvians living in the border area have a knowledge of Russian language, but its usage in everyday communication is questionable.

Unlike the eastern border with Russia, the southern border of Estonia has more potential to turn into an integrated cross-border region (like Euroregion) (Berg 2001a, 101–5).

3.4. Internal (Estonia-Latvia) and External (Estonia-Russia) Borders of EU

Estonia's border with Latvia is an internal Schengen border, while Estonia's border with Russia is EU's external border. After joining the Schengen zone, Estonia ceased the checks on internal borders.[48] Against it, Estonia-Russia border is a subject of everyday border control.

According to the survey by Lundén in 2002 (before Schengen area membership), 52 % of respondents in Valga experienced border-crossing difficulties, while 36 % didn't have such practice. In Valka, 78%[49] experienced barrier effects of the border in contrast to 20% of the respondents, who didn't mark such occasions. Non-citizens of Latvia and Estonia were

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[47]The Saturday markets are common in Valga.
[48] Checks were temporarily introduced in 2010 for the meeting of NATO foreign ministers and in 2014, because of the visit of U.S. President Barack Obama (ERR 2017c).
[49] The higher percentage in Valka, Lundén explains by more frequency of 'Valkans' to cross the border.

restricted to cross the border (max. 90 days per year), with special permissions for schooling; Estonian and Latvian passport holders had the permission of border crossing up to 150 days per year; While non-citizens were required to get the special stamps in their passports, citizenship holders just showed the official travel documment (Lundén 2002, 194). Such crossing-related difficulties have disappeared after the opening of the internal borders.

The picture is considerably different at the external Estonia-Russia (EU-Russia) border. The border check points in Shumilkino-Luhamaa, Kunitshnaya Gora-Koidula, and Ivangorod-Narva are fully equipped with new devices (total price EUR 12.1 million) to accelerate the process of cargo examination (Komerk 2016). Moreover, Estonia has developed an internet-based platform for registration to ensure swift border-crossing.

The icy political relationships, bureaucratic burden, mutual distrust, social-economic disparities of the border regions are influencing the quality of border management. While Estonia is more decentralized and municipalities have their own plans of development, the Russian law on regional and local governments does not include instructions for international projects and they are required to be approved by the central government (Lundén 2002, 192; Boman 2005b, 42). Moreover, Estonians have more competitive skills to manage and plan the CBC programs, Russians do not have the adequate knowledge over the benefits CBC generates[50] (Berg, Boman, and Kolossov 2005, 20–21).

3.5. What the Field Research (Semi-Structured Interviewing) Reveals?

The field research enables us to make general conclusion: different actors involved in cross-border interactions see the eastern and southern borders of Estonia in a different way. While the community perceives the eastern border as Estonian-Russian border, the state narratives characterize it as a strict dividing line between the EU/NATO and Russia. The field research reveals that the cross-border reality of Estonia could not be explained by a single model, but it requires a mix of marble and layer MLG features. First of all, we should

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[50] Also, in most cases, there are no persons responsible for the CBC at the local (rayon) level.

distinguish two key stands under the term 'cross-border practices' – cross-border policy/strategy–making and everyday cross-border interaction/operative works.

National Level

Under the planning of cross-border strategy and policy-making, the EU and Estonian state both share the competencies and functions. The state official remarks: "we follow the instructions from the EU. As a state, of course, the state is doing the policy what is missing in the EU policy or when something concrete is needed, it is up to the state" (Interview, Ministry of the Interior, 08.12.2017). Moreover, the different Estonian and Latvian state agencies are represented in the management of the EU-backed CBC programmes being implemented on the southern and eastern borders of Estonia. For instance, the Estonian Ministry of Finance, as a managing and national responsible authority of the INTERREG Estonia-Latvia, has a regular project-based cooperation and coordination with the Latvian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development. This EU-financed EST-LAT program supports co-operation between the different departments of the ministries of states, plus local and regional authorities, group of auditors, socio-economic partners and the European Commission. The Estonia-Russia CBC programme has the same design of the management body (Interviews, Ministry of Finance, 09.01.2018). The role of the Estonian state was highlighted by the municipality official in Narva: "You cannot regulate any cross-border relations without involvement of partners from the federal level on the Russian side and the national level in Estonia" (Interview with Narva Municipality Official, 14.11.2017).

On the contrary, the state official evaluates the involvement of local level: "of course, it is input to the policy, because if things are not going pretty well, this input from the local level comes to the state level, and if there is no help from the state level, we communicate it to the EU level. For example, as you can see the readmission agreement with Russia, there are problems; Russians do not fulfill the readmission agreement, which is made between EU and Russia. In this case, we receive this information from the local level, and we are trying to

solve it or informing to the EU" (Interview, 08.12.2017). In the cross-border context, there occurs mostly 'task-related' cooperation among the state agencies, "There are several stakeholders starting from the companies or counties which are interested in having new lines or railway lines, we [the Ministry of Interior] are more involved in the cooperation through the Ministry of Economics and Finance", but "if we are talking strictly about the border management, our main partners are Ministry of Economics, Customs and Ministry of Finance" (Interview, 08.12.2017). While evaluating the working experience on the cross-border issues with the Latvian and Russian partners, the interviewee mentions how different internal state regulations, tender rules, financing and paperwork slow the process down in both cases. But, at the same time, the state representative highlights the strong and overlapping cooperation with the Latvian state institutions "we are also working on the EU level, we are coordinating our positions, we have a special forum of the Eastern border member states, and we are gathering foreign ministers once a year. We have a framework of multi-ministerial cooperation. So, the cooperation is pretty strong. We are so small in Europe, if we want to be heard somehow, we have to be a bigger forum. Baltic States, we have very good cooperation, we have same problems and almost same understanding" (Interview, 08.12.2017). In case of the eastern neighbor, the disagreement over the border treaty, sanctions and crises effect on the collaboration in the cross-border context.

The interviews carried out with key state officials responsible for CBC in Estonia enable us to make the following conclusions: First of all, CBC is not a 'simple polity' concentrated on a single level and mode of governance, but a 'compound polity' which refers to the multiple levels and modes of governance and corporatist policy-making (Bache 2010, 2). Second, there is a vertical power diffusion upwards to the EU in terms of cross-border policy-making and downward to the local level (in case of the southern border)

Local Level

The contributions and efforts of the local level in the daily cross-border practices are foremost. But, the degree of the involvement of the Estonian, Latvian, and Russian local levels comparatively differ in terms of their interests, local autonomy or priorities. For instance, the Estonian local level plays a much more important role in the cross-border activities rather than their Russian counterparts. As an Estonian local level representative from Narva notes "In Russia, you have local level, regional level, and federal local, and Ivangorod is a border area, where many issues are [decided] by federal agencies. Every action the local administration makes [Ivangorod] in cross-border cooperation, it tends to go either through the regional or oblast level, or directly to the federal level. Even the porters themselves are not governed by local regional authorities, but by federal authorities. We don't do a lot of work on policy drafting here at the local level; these policies are made by our politicians on the national level. But, we, at the local level, we have much more to say or produce our input in the cross-border policies than our Russian colleagues" (Interview, 14.11.2017). Due to the final report of the European Commission (2015) on the local autonomy index, the value (LAmean, 1990-2014) for Estonia is 24.30 (13th place) and Latvia 19.82 (24th place) among the 39 countries[51] (Ladner, Keuffer, and Baldersheim 2016, 60). On the other hand, the politics of local government in Russia is at the very early stage of development and its success is linked to full-fledged national democratization; market economy, state-building, power decentralization and rule of law, which seems less realistic to be fulfilled in a swift and painless way (Vladimir Gel'man 2002, 504–6).

Moreover, the local state actors have had unequal interests and priorities. On the eastern border, Narva Municipality representative comments that the Russian side is mostly interested in economic projects because of the financial income, "cultural and education projects, we are doing because we want. But, they are mostly interested in economic projects and European Union money which comes to their side" (Interview, 14.11.2017). In the e-

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[51] Covering EU, EEA (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein) and Switzerland (EFTA), Albania, Macedonia, Moldova, Georgia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine, The highest value of LA mean is in Switzerland – 29.23.

mail correspondence with Ivangorod Municipality representative, she clarifies: "В настоящее время наш совместный инфраструктурный проект «Интегрированное развитие исторической прибрежной зоны в Нарве/Эстония и Ивангороде/Россия, 3 этап – Речные променады» находится на рассмотрении Еврокомиссии. Надеемся, что к лету будет принято по нему положительное решение, и с сентября 2018 года мы приступим к реализации…. В настоящее время мы используем только программу «Россия-Эстония». Она охватывает слишком большую территорию и слишком трудная для написания заявок. Нужны более простые варианты и небольшими суммами финансирования на обе стороны" (mail Interviewing, 27.12.2017)[52].

The situation differs on the southern border of Estonia, where the local municipalities (Valga-Valka) are drivers of more balanced cooperation, which covers a wide range of economic/infrastructural, social, and cultural activities. For instance, Valka-Valga urban area development that includes common parks, streets and squares; Valga-Valka mobility aims at developing a cross-border labor market and is designed for entrepreneurs and people who are looking for new job opportunities; joint research work on how to develop the common area, with involvement of communities, employers and entrepreneurs; an edition of a trilingual newspaper (Estonian, Russian, and Latvian) to inform the local community about local vacancies from both sides of the border, a reporting of what border communities should know to start work in the cross-border environment and demands of Estonian and Latvian companies. Moreover, Valga and Valka municipalities share the functions to organize and celebrate their city days; Latvians usually organize in the spring-time, while Estonians do it in the autumn. Also, they prepare a joint event calendar (public ads calendar) to inform both sides about the events organized in Estonian Valga and Latvian Valka. Furthermore, during the joint cultural events, other actors (such as the Vocational Education Centre, the Tourism Information Center, the EU Agencies, etc.) operating in the cross-border area introduce the Estonian and Latvian communities to their services and works. Unlike the Narva-Ivangorod

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[52] The e-mail correspondence was originally done in Russian due to the preference of the interviewee.

municipality representatives who meet up to six times a year, Valga and Valka local levels have a monthly reunion to discuss the top cooperation plans. In many instances, the communities of the southern twin towns use each other's services such as ambulance and emergency services. The municipalities negotiate to create a common regular transport line. A Valga Municipality worker states that "we have an idea to share public transportation. But, so far, Latvians, for some reasons, are yet not ready for it, but I think {it will be possible} in the future. May be some legal issues and budget things are behind this issue, may be the need how to share the costs" (Interview with Valga Municipality representative, 12.12.2017). During the interview, the Valga municipality representative highlighted that both municipalities jointly founded the Latvian-Estonian Institute on the Valka side of the border, mainly focused on language studies and translation work. Moreover, "there is an Arts School on the Latvian side, but both is using those services, Estonian children are going there. They have language lessons as well, but mainly art" (Interview, 12.12.2017). Also, it is worth mentioning that the local fire and police service strongly cooperate, but "It is still an issue to cross the border".

The municipalities over the eastern border have some traditions - "У наших муниципалитетов есть свои совместные традиции и общие мероприятия, которые мы реализуем самостоятельно, без финансирования фондов. Таких мероприятий в год проходит около 10: встреча Деда Мороза и Йыулуванна (была 20.12.17), поздравление первенца, родившегося в новом году, совместные заседания комиссии по приграничному сотрудничеству, проведение совместных заседаний депутатов, фотокросс, велопоход по местам боев за Ивангород и Нарву, участие в Днях городов, Ветеранское подворье, спортивные и культурные мероприятия счету не поддаются (практически все) и т.д" (e-mail correspondence 27.12.2017).

Regarding the interrelation with other layers of governance (state or regional) of border neighbours, the local municipalities of Valga and Narva have had only project-based communication with them, which is not very common and active.

The field research in the cross-border area and interviews with the municipality representatives demonstrate that on the southern border (Valka-Valga) both sides have realized the critical importance of cooperation that goes swifter; there are daily internal mobility for work purposes (for instance, the Vocational Education Center has Latvian employees from Valka, Valga municipality has Estonian workers who live in Valka, etc.); different national legislation and finance schemes hinder the possibility to create joint services (such as transportation, recycling), nevertheless, their own services firmly cooperate. On the eastern border (Narva-Ivangorod), the CBC is mainly considered as a way to get EU financial support. The cooperation is more asymmetric among Narva and Ivangorod municipalities, and the Estonian side is a key driver. During the interviews, the Estonian regional (county) level is evaluated as less meaningful, with limited financial and human resources, to take any initiatives in the cross-border context. The local level of southern and eastern border regions mainly refers to the state agencies in Tallinn/Tartu or consults with Estonian MEPs in Brussels.

Non-State Actors

The interviewee from the Estonian non-profit sector operating in the eastern cross-border area of Estonia perceives its role vital to fill the communication gaps between the intergovernmental relations of Russia and Estonia. As the respondent explains, it's easier for an NGO to find common interests with the local rather than the state level, "At the local level (Narva, Mustvee, and Rakvere), the understanding on Russia is quite different from the state level. They are very pragmatic, and we can find common ground quite easily. When we go to the governmental level, when we talk to different ministries or invite them to events, their policy still has to follow different EU regulations and national government priorities

and working with Russia is not a priority for them. There are no finances. The state government does not support us in any way to work with Russia. Working with regional, local, and state levels is quite different. When we talk to the local government, they can understand the needs of working with Russia, they have contacts on the other side of the border, but they do not have funds to support us. When we have events, they come, and they do not have money to support us. While in the governmental level, there are more funds, but this is not in the priority list" (Interview with NGO representative, 20.11.2017). The official from Ivangorod explains the involvement of non-profit sector accordingly: "В Ивангороде неправительственных организаций очень мало – это ветеранская организация. Они активно вовлечены в приграничное сотрудничество. У них заключено несколько договоров с нарвскими культурными обществами. Регулярно проходят встречи как в Нарве, так и в Ивангороде. Некоммерческих организаций тоже не много. Есть муниципальный фонд «Ивангородский центр устойчивого развития». Он активно работает в приграничных проектах. Начиная с 2004 года и по сей день им реализовано несколько проектов по развитию туризма и малого бизнеса. Сам фонд появился в результате совместного приграничного проекта" (e-mail correspondence, 27.12.2017)

The EU-financed EST-LAT and Estonia-Russia CBC programs are the best partnership platforms which provide the involvement of non-state actors such as NGOs, private companies, universities, competence centers, entrepreneurs and foundations in the cross-border practices. The interest of Estonian NGOs in cross-border issues is high, but financing isn't easily catchable. As the interviewee remarks, 80 project proposals were submitted to the Estonia-Russia CBC program and finally, only 10 of them got funds. Besides the lack of finance, working on the eastern cross-border regions is more challenging rather than in the border regions with Latvia, because "Latvia is an EU member, no border, more available funds. In the case of Russia, we basically have only one available source of funding, which is very limited. Logistically, you need to apply for a visa; it takes 15 EUR and two weeks, takes lots of effort and time to travel. In the case of Latvia, it is easier and less challengeable. At the

personal level and project management, in the case of Russia, decisions take more time and are more centralized. Latvian project management style is more informal. In Russia, English language knowledge is quite poor. We had some example, when we involved local municipality people, they did not reply to emails. It is complicated to get any kind of information back from them" (Interview, 20.11.2017)

The field research shows that the role of non-state actors (especially NGOs) is not equally perceived by the Estonian and Russian state or local level. They are involved in the daily cross-border interrelation mainly throughout the EU funding scheme. The shortage of finance and other practical border-crossing procedures on the eastern border are burden for their daily works. Due to previous experience, they were largely involved in the consultations during the drafting/developing of the Estonia-Russia CBC program and EU INTERREG EST-LAT. But, they are less represented, or their voice is less heard by the state-level while drafting the cross-border strategy.

Chapter IV: Conclusion

This study enables to make the well-crafted conclusions. It re-affirms that cross-border cooperation explicitly requires coordination with the array of actors at various levels. The case of Estonia clarifies that local level of the southern border regions have strong understanding of the local aspects of mutual interdependence.

Referring to the research question, this study explores which type of MLG better explains the cross-border practices over the Schengen internal and EU external border, reflecting on the case of Estonia. The reality of cross-border interrelations among different stakeholders over Estonia's eastern or southern border could not be explained by a single layer or marble interpretation. It seems that both types co-exist in the Estonian cross-border context, with some differences on the Schengen external and internal borders. First, while discussing the cross-border practices, the thesis differentiates cross-border policy-making and daily operative works in cross-border regions.

The interviews enable to make the following conclusions over the cross-border policy-making in Estonia:

- o In terms of the border policy-making, the formal authority has been diffused from the Estonian national level to supranational (EU level) and local (municipal level). There are a limited number of jurisdiction at limited territorial levels (only EU, national, local) observed.
- o Estonian state and the EU have distinct realms of non-intersecting jurisdictions; the patters of their policy inputs are clearly defined.
- o There are multi-task governments observed, with bundle of responsibilities starting from the policy implementation to the organization of the cultural events, so called "general purpose jurisdiction". But, the allocation of policy competences across the jurisdictional levels is flexible.
- o Jurisdictions are territorial and stable.

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- NGOs and non-state actors mentioned their involvement in the border policy making process, mainly in the south, but this involvement is mostly spontaneous, not systematic and regular.

In relation to daily cross-border practices in the Estonian border regions, the followings are observed on the southern border with Latvia:

- It seems impracticable to single out which layer (EU, national, or local) is a key leader or driver. There are more task-related and functionally overlapping jurisdictions, flexible inter-relations, with upward (state to supranational), downward (state to local), and horizontal (non-state and private actors) shifts of governance;
- The cross-border area in the south is a more functional institutionalized space with cross-border/transnational movements, public-private partnerships, Valga-Valka municipality cooperation, project-based inter-regional cooperation, regular exchange meetings and patterns of joint research, education, and cultural initiatives. So, the EU and state level are supplemented with other actors through functional networks (a mixture of vertical and horizontal shifts of governance);
- The principle of cross-border collaboration is based on the accumulation of knowledge and collective learning, which supports the heterogeneity within Estonian and Latvian communities.
- Non-state partners are regarded as equal to create public goods.
- There are actors (for instance, educational centers) whose works are need-based for the local communities.
- The favourable environment is created for entrepreneurship and volunteering.

The eastern border demonstrates different picture, here:

o Cross-border relations is a by-product of two-level interactions rather than multiple levels - mostly, EU/Estonian state and Russian federal agencies and local levels with comparatively limited policy competence and impacts.

o There are active and regular inter-local interrelations, but the outcome of such meetings is at risk, because the hierarchical system of decision-making in Russia matters a lot.

o Non-state actors are not regarded as equal partners in the cross-border context.

In both cases, different legislations, economic regulations, bilateral relations, state culture or national preferences hold cross-border cooperation back; however, this cooperation is more institutionalized in the south that is indispensable pre-requisite for its success. In the south, there are clear 'bottom-up' signs of cross-border integration with involvement of regional planners, entrepreneurs, local communities, local consultancy agencies, educational institutions, both municipalities, regional/state agencies, with a certain role of the EU and Estonian state. Accordingly, there is a solid basis the Euroregion-type structure to be established. Across the eastern borderland, it seems to be a more elitist process.

The case of Estonia validates the theoretical assumptions on the complexity of CBC. It enables to make the following statements which have both scientific and practical implications:

• Type of borders matter and open borders tend to support the wide-spread of fluid need-based jurisdictions.

• The controlled borders support the condition when a number of limited jurisdictions at local level are nested in the higher ones.

- Dissimilar degree of autonomy, competences and priorities of regional and local governments make the flourish of multi-functional CBC questionable.

- Cross-border policy-making follows the logic of intergovernmental relations.

- CBC in the newly established European states is at the initial stage to become self-sustainable, based on the grassroots. EU financial support is a key driver.

- Simultaneous institutionalized cooperation (like membership to Schengen, Eurozone, other intergovernmental, inter-communal or EU-level platforms and etc.) increases trustfulness among parties and locals consider locals from the other side of border as equal partners, not categorize them as "outsiders". They tend to grant borders a meaning of contact zone.

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Annexes:

The interviews have been structured on basis of three key postulates: general enquiries on the importance of CBC for border cities, jurisdictional and competence-related questions.

Questions to Local Level of Governance:

- Could you explain why cross-border cooperation is significant for Narva/Valga city?
- For you, as an official representative, how will you categorize eastern and southern borders: is it an ethnic border, European Union-Russia/Estonia or Estonia-Russia/Latvia border? What does this border mean for you?
- Which level of jurisdiction is the most important to draft cross-border policies (local level, sub-national level, national level, or EU level)?
- What are the contributions this level makes for cross-border cooperation?
- Please, discuss the involvement of the EU level in CBC. What type of support does the EU provide?
- Please, discuss Ida-Virumaa/Valga counties (regions), how often do you have contact with them on the cross-border issues?
- Is the university/educational associations (e.g. Narva College in the eastern cross-border region, or vocational school in the southern cross-border region) involved in the cross-border activities and how?
- Who is a driver of CBC in this region?
- Could you position these four levels (national, local, regional and EU) from 'very important' to 'less important '?
- Are there any competencies (like functions and/or services) that you are sharing with other levels of governance and think that it should be located under the jurisdiction of local level?
- If there is any need of involvement or any kind of support or consultation over the cross-border policies, whom should you contact?
- Could you name any semi-state or non-state institutions that come to your mind, because they were involved in the cross-border policy drafting with you?
- What do not you like in the working style of your partner municipality on the other side of border?
- Averagely, how many times do you have meeting with the representatives of Ivangorod/Valka municipality during a year and what is the agenda of such meetings?
- Does the municipality organize joint meetings which incorporate representatives of different sectors like teachers, pupils and etc. from the other side of the border?
- Please, discuss the most successful cross-border projects you were involved in.
- If there are any failed CBC projects, who were involved inside and what are the key reasons for its failure?

- Is there any a future plan or ongoing works to develop the common services between Ivangorod and Narva/ Valga and Valka?
- When the political relations between Estonia and Russia are considerably strained, how is it reflected at local level?
- Regarding the cross-border institutions, like Euroregions. Is it acceptable for the municipality to be such institutionalization launched and could you explain the rationale behind it?
- While drafting the cross-border policies, are you taking the models of the "best cases" into account and which one?
- What about the private/business organization. Are their voice taken into account while drafting the CBC projects?
- How the local municipality is involved in the Estonia-Latvia Cross-Border Cooperation Programme /EST-RUS Programme and what is done so far?
- Except the EU finance projects, in which fields does the local government cooperate with Valka/Ivangorod municipality?
- How the municipalities are involved in the organization of the activities across the border?
- How will you evaluate, both sides of the borders are motivated to do the work jointly or you push each other?
- Is there any plan to have common services? What type of negotiation do you have?
- How local municipality cooperates to the regional level of Latvia/Russia or state/Federal level? What kinds of intersections happen?
- In your local municipality budget, do you have any budget line dedicated to the development of cross-border cooperation?

Questions to National Level of Governance

- How will you evaluate the eastern border of Estonia, as Estonian-Russian or EU-Russian border?
- Which stakeholders are the most actively involved in the cross-border policy (EU, national state, regional level and local level)?
- How are regional level (counties) and local municipalities involved in CBC?
- How do you think, is there any functions that should be delivered to the local municipalities because they have enough resources and competence to implement it?
- How other stakeholders like local NGOs, private sector, semi-state institutions are involved in the CBC policy-making?
- Except Estonia–Latvia and Estonia-Russia programmes, is there any cross-border cooperation line in the whole national budget of Estonia?

- Do you get some kind of feedback from the beneficiaries of the umbrella CBC programs financed by the EU, what are the main troubles that hinder the proper implementation of the program at the external border of the Schengen? How do you compare this situation to the neighbouring Latvia?

- How does the new territorial-administrative reform of Estonia effect on the cross-border regions?

- When you have to consult or inform the other side of the border about the cross-border policy. Do you refer to the state/federal level, or regional/oblast level?

- From the practical standpoint, is it easier to work with Latvians over CBC issues rather than Russian counterparts?

- How do the state-level relations influence on the cross-border policy between Russia and Estonia?

- Could we say that on the Estonia-Latvia border there are different challenges because it is a part of Eurozone and Schengen rather than on the eastern border where two countries have sanctions and not favourable political relationships?

- Except, the EU-finance programs, could you name any national programs that have the cross-border effects?

- Could you name one of the most successful achievements of the EU-financed programs?

- As EST-LAT of cross-border cooperation 2013-2020 is a continuation of the programme 2007-2013. Are there any topics or components which were not in the previous program and the management decided to add up?

- In case of cross-border twinning towns –Valga and Valka, could you name the most important problems they are facing right now and how the state is trying to fix it?

- How do you evaluate this cooperation, it is more "bottom-up" cooperation initiated by the local level or it is state-centered initiative?

- Without the necessity of the additional institutional enlargement, do the local municipalities have the respective human or functional competences to spend EU money in effective way?

## Questions to non-state, private and semi-state actors

- How do you evaluate the role of NGOs in cross-border policy-making over the eastern/southern border of Estonia?

- What type of project –based services NGOs provide in the cross-border area?

- What are the key challenges while communicating with local level, county level and state level over the cross-border initiatives and how will you evaluate, to which level your cooperation is more successful?
- Is the voice of NGOs more or less taken into account when the state officials drafting their cross-border policies?
- How do you evaluate your relationships with NGOs on the other side of the border, do you have any contacts with them or with governmental agencies? What does this collaboration include?
- Do you have any collaboration with the business-private organizations on the other side of the border? What does this collaboration include?
- Could you talk about the differences between the Estonia-Russia and Estonia-Latvia cross-border projects and challenges of your daily project management? Who are drivers of these projects? To compare, where are cross-border projects more successful?
- When you look the functions of the local municipalities or state in the cross border regions, should they be enriched, revised or shifted to other levels of governmence?

## Annex 2: EU Geopolitical Models

Geopolitical Models

Westphalian

Imperial

Neomedieval

(Browning and Joenniemi 2008, 523)

Annex 3: EU Geostrategies

EU Geostrategies

Networked (non)border

EU   Outside

March

EU   Buffer Zone   Outside

Colonial Frontier

EU   Outside

Limes

EU   Outside

(Browning and Joenniemi 2008, 528)

Retrieved from manuscript titled "European Territorial Cooperation, Building Bridges between People (2011), of the European Commission, Directorate-General for Regional Policy

Cross-border cooperation 1989 – 2013

Participating regions

- since 1989
- since 1994
- since 1995
- since 2004
- since 2007
- other regions

NUTS3 regions as of 01/01/2008.
Including partly eligible regions.
2007-2013: Including ENPI programme areas
(not covered by this publication).

0   500 Km

© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries

Annex 5: Cross-Border Cooperation 2007-2013

Retrieved from manuscript titled "European Territorial Cooperation, Building Bridges between People (2011), of the European Commission, Directorate-General for Regional Policy;
ERDF – European Regional Development Fund;
IPA – Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance;

Cross-border cooperation 2007–13: ERDF and IPA programmes

Annex 6: Political Map of Estonia